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BARKING UP THE WRONG TREE
INTRODUCTION
On April 30, 2003, President Bush signed into law the
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation
of Children Today Act of 2003, also known as the PROTECT Act.'
Generally lauded by many supporters and opponents of the
"Feeney Amendment" alike, the PROTECT Act works to nationalize
the AMBER Alert system,2 combat child abduction, and increase
penalties for sexual crimes and pornography involving children.
One amendment to the bill-the so-called "Feeney Amendment"--
however, has created a firestorm of controversy in the wake of the
bill's passage. The Feeney Amendment purports to make major
changes in the process of criminal sentencing under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines. Included as "Section IV: Sentencing Reform"
of the PROTECT Act, the Feeney Amendment attempts to reduce
substantially the practice of "downward departures" from the
Sentencing Guidelines, a practice by which a judge sentences a
defendant below the prescribed penalties for various crimes.3
Many critics of the Feeney Amendment have labeled it an attack
on judicial independence because it limits criminal sentencing
discretion of federal Article III judges and requires reports on the
departure practices of judges. Vocal criticism has emanated from
various quarters: academia, the federal judiciary, the media, and
legislators.' This Note argues that the general tone of the criticism
and the repeated references to it as an "attack on judicial independ-
ence" are not warranted,
Most of the critics' assertions about protection of judicial
independence-although cloaked in arguments about the separation
1. PROTECTAct, Pub. L. No. 108-21,117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codifiedin scattered sections
of 18, 28, 42, and 47 U.S.C.); Statement of President George W. Bush upon Signing S. 151,
39 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 502-04 (Apr. 30, 2003).
2. The AMBER Alert system is an early warning system designed to help find abducted
children. Code Amber Foundation, About the AMBER Alert Program, available at
http'J/www.codeamberfoundation.org (last visited June 4, 2004).
3. See Part L.A for a description of the most controversial changes that the Feeney
Amendment makes to the guidelines sentencing system. Critics describe these changes as
an attack on judicial independence.
4. See infra Part I.C.
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of powers and usurpation of judicial discretion-are, in fact, policy
arguments against the Sentencing Guidelines themselves.5
Moreover, many critics-including federal judges-use the rubric
of judicial independence to criticize the working of the Sentencing
Guidelines as too harsh and rigid. These critics decry the removal
of district judges' access to downward departures to "remedy" the
wrongs of the Sentencing Guidelines system. This Note argues
neither that, as a normative issue, current sentencing policy is
appropriate, nor that the Feeney Amendment and the diminished
discretion of judges to engage in downward departures were, as a
matter of policy, correct. Instead, this Note advances the argument
that these policy criticisms are not appropriately tied to the concept
of judicial independence. Judicial independence is undoubtedly an
extremely important tenet of our constitutional system, but it is not
a talisman. Rather, it is a limited concept that does not avoid the
precept that the federal judiciary is still subject to the will of
Congress in various ways-including the making of policy on
criminal sentencing.
In Part I, this Note describes the most controversial aspects of
the Feeney Amendment, those most often cited in critiques of the
amendment, and their implementation up to this point. In addition,
this Part outlines some of the main arguments against and in
support of the amendment. Part II examines varying definitions of
judicial independence and provides a standard by which to measure
this amendment as a purported infringement of judicial independ-
5. This Note does not purport to provide an extensive separation of powers justification
for the Sentencing Guidelines system itself but assumes that the U.S. Supreme Court
already answered this question in Mistretta v. United States. 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989)
(holding by an eight-to-one majority that Congress did not violate the separation of powers
doctrine by creating the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and U.S. Sentencing Commission).
Although critics of the Feeney Amendment are often critics of the Sentencing Guidelines
system as a whole, this Note attempts to answer only those arguments that criticize the
Feeney Amendment as an attack on judicial independence. In response to criticisms of the
Feeney Amendment as a separation of powers violation, at least one federal court has held
that the PROTECT Act alterations to the guidelines system do not alter the system
sanctioned in Mistretta to such an extent that it would violate the separation of powers. See
United States v. Schnepper, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1198-1200 (D. Haw. 2004). But see United
States v. Mendoza, No. 03-CR-730-ALL, 2004 WL 1191118, *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2004)
(holding that all portions of the Feeney Amendment were constitutional, with the exception
of DOJ reporting on individual judges' sentencing practices, which the court held violated the
separation of powers).
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ence. Part III analyzes why much of the contemporary criticism of
the amendment as an attack on judicial independence is misplaced,
as the amendment is properly within Congress's legislative power,
does not have the actual effects its critics purport it has, and leaves
intact the key safeguards of judicial independence. Finally, this
Note concludes that, although there may be other criticisms that
could be lodged against the Feeney Amendment as a matter of
policy, the most popular critique-that it is an attack on judicial
independence-is unsupported by the historical and current
understanding of that concept.
I. OUTLINE OF THE CONTROVERSY
A. What Is the Feeney Amendment?
The Feeney Amendment6 enacts significant legislative changes
to the Sentencing Guidelines system, established by the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, in the area of departure authority-the ability
of sentencing courts to sentence outside of the prescribed guidelines
range-and in the appellate review of sentencing court departure
decisions.' The most controversial reforms to the sentencing system
include broad directives to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the federal judiciary related to
the use of departures in general.' These reforms have the broadest
impact on sentencing and are most often cited in critiques of the
Feeney Amendment as an encroachment on judicial independence.
The substance of these reforms is briefly described below.
The first of these changes is the alteration of the appellate
standard of review for district court departure decisions and new
requirements imposed on district courts in making departures. The
PROTECT Act now requires that the district court provide specific
6. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667 (2003).
7. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM
THE FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 7 (2003), available at http-/www.ussc.gov/departrpt03/
departrpt03.pdf [hereinafter U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT].
8. There were also various amendments made directly to the Sentencing Guidelines
altering the prescribed guideline punishments and reducing the availability of downward
departures in kidnaping and child sex-offense cases. See U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT, supra
note 7, at 8-9 (explaining these changes).
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reasons in writing for any departure along with its written order of
judgment and commitment, unless the sentencing court "relies upon
statements received in camera."9 The Act also requires that the
court base all departures on the statutory purposes of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines. °
More controversially, the PROTECT Act alters the standard of
review that appellate courts must employ for the review of depar-
ture decisions. The act requires de novo review of a district court's
departure decision in cases where "the district court failed to
provide the written statement of reasons" for the departure or
where the departure is based upon a factor that "does not advance
the objectives" of the guidelines, "is not authorized" under the
guidelines, or "is not justified by the facts of the case."1'
In the event an appellate court finds the departure impermissi-
ble, the appellate court is required to set aside the sentence and
remand to the district court with instructions to re-sentence. 12 The
PROTECT Act goes one step further to ensure that the decision of
the appellate court is, in fact, applied at re-sentencing. The Act
requires the sentencing court to sentence within the applicable
guidelines range and not depart from that range unless the grounds
for departure were specifically included in the previous sentencing
order and were held by the court of appeals, in remanding the case,
to be permissible grounds for departure. 3 This highly significant
portion of the amendment alters the previous standard of review
under Koon v. United States, in which the Supreme Court held that
the decisions of a district court in applying the guidelines to the
facts should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.'4
Another major aspect of the amendment was the directive to the
U.S. Sentencing Commission, the agency tasked with writing and
implementing the guidelines, to "ensure that the incidence of
9. PROTECT Act § 401(c); U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.
10. PROTECT Act § 401(d); U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.
11. PROTECT Act § 401(d); U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 9. If the
appellate court finds a departure is warranted, the appellate court is then required to give
"due deference to the district court's determination" of the extent of departure that is
reasonable. U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 9 n.32.
12. PROTECT Act § 401(d).
13. Id. § 401(e).
14. 518 U.S. 81, 91 (1996).
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downward departures are [sic] substantially reduced." 5 In an
attempt to meet this goal, Congress mandated that prior to May
2005 the Sentencing Commission "shall not promulgate any
amendment to the sentencing guidelines ... that adds any new
grounds [for] ... departure .... 1 In addition to limiting the addition
of new grounds for departure, Congress required that within 180
days the Sentencing Commission had to "review the grounds of
downward departure that are authorized by the sentencing
guidelines... and promulgate, pursuant to [the Sentencing Commis-
sion's statutory authority] appropriate amendments to the sentenc-
ing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary to ensure
that the incidence of downward departures are [sic] substantially
reduced." 7
Some of the most controversial aspects of the PROTECT Act are
the provisions requiring reporting on departure practices, especially
reporting by the DOJ. The first reporting provision requires that
"Itihe Chief Judge of each district court ... ensure" that all judges
within their district submit a report of their sentencing decisions to
the Sentencing Commission "within thirty days [of the] entry of
judgment in [a] criminal case .18 This report must include a
statement of reasons for the sentence imposed, the identity of the
sentencing judge, and various other materials. 9 The Sentencing
Commission must analyze this information annually, submit a
report to Congress, and make the reports and documentation
available, upon request, to the House and Senate Committees on
the Judiciary and the DOJ.2
Moreover, the PROTECT Act requires the adoption of new
policies and procedures by the DOJ to ensure that DOJ attorneys
"oppose sentencing adjustments, including downward departures,
15. PROTECT Act § 401(m).
16. Id. § 401(j)(2).
17. Id. § 401(m). In conformance with this directive, the Sentencing Commission issued
a report to Congress in October 2003. See generally U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note
7. The Sentencing Commission also made various amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines.
See infra Part I.B.2.
18. PROTECT Act § 401(h).
19. These materials include the pre-sentence report, any plea agreement, the indictment,
and whatever else the Sentencing Commission requests. Id.
20. Id.
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that are not supported by the facts and the law," "make a sufficient
record so as to permit the possibility of an appeal," and "ensure the
vigorous pursuit of appropriate and meritorious appeals of such
adverse [sentencing] decisions."2 Congress required the DOJ to
adopt new policies and procedures to comply with this law within
ninety days or, alternatively, to comply with more stringent
reporting requirements.22 Much of the initial criticism surrounding
the Feeney Amendment has centered on these more stringent DOJ
reporting requirements and on fears that they would lead to the
creation of a judicial "blacklist" by the DOJ. These reporting
requirements would have required the Attorney General, upon the
granting of any non-substantial assistance downward departure, to
submit a report to Congress explaining the case, the circumstances
surrounding the departure, and the identity of the district judge
within fifteen days.23 Additionally, the Attorney General would be
required to inform Congress within five days of the Solicitor
General's decision on appealing the sentence.24 The DOJ chose to
adopt new policies and procedures in accord with the law rather
than adhering to these Congressional reporting requirements.25
B. Implementation of the Feeney Amendment
In order to discern the impact of the controversial Feeney
Amendment provisions on judicial independence, the analysis must
be conducted not by looking solely at the statute itself. A proper
analysis also considers how the statute has been implemented and
whether that implementation is an infringement upon judicial
independence. To that end, this Section analyzes the early imple-
mentation of the Act by the DOJ, the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
and the federal courts of appeals.
21. Id. § 401(1).
22. Id.; U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 11.
23. PROTECT Act § 401(1); U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 11 n.36.
24. PROTECT Act § 401(1); U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 11 n.36.
25. The DOJ's implementation of these polices and procedures is described infra Part
I.B.1.
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1. The Department of Justice
The DOJ responded to the PROTECT Act by aligning its policies
and procedures with the requirements of the Act as described
above.26 On July 28, 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft sent a
memorandum to all federal prosecutors stressing that to ensure
that the Sentencing Guidelines will be more "faithfully and
consistently enforced"-as Congress directed in passage of the
Sentencing Guidelines and the PROTECT Act-all Justice Depart-
ment attorneys "have an affirmative obligation to oppose any
sentencing adjustments, including downward departures, that are
not supported by the facts and the law" and to "take all steps
necessary to ensure the district court record is sufficient to permit
the possibility of an appeal" of the improper sentence adjustment.27
This memorandum describes four key procedural reforms the
DOJ made to ensure that the Sentencing Guidelines were upheld.
Department attorneys now must notify "Main Justice" within
fourteen days of an adverse sentencing decision-such as a
departure decision made over the government's objection-in cases
that meet objective criteria set forth in an amendment to the U.S.
Attorney's Manual 28 made effective as of the date of the memoran-
dum.29 Included are criteria that mirror the PROTECT Act's
concern for unwarranted departures in general 0 and cases where
26. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
27. See Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft, United States Department
of Justice, to All Federal Prosecutors 1-3 (July 28, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Ashcroft Appeals Memo].
28. See id. at A-1 to A-2 (amendment to § 9-2.170(B) of the U.S. Attorney's Manual,
effective July 28, 2003).
29. Id. at 4.
30. The U.S. Attorney's Manual amendment provides that attorneys should report
departure decisions that, inter alia, "reduce the sentencing range from Zone C or D to a lower
zone in cases in which no term of imprisonment is imposed," are two or more criminal history
categories based on over representation of the seriousness of the defendant's criminal
history, reflect "departures of three or more offense levels based on a 'discouraged' factor, an
'unmentioned' factor, ... or an 'impermissible' factor" under the Sentencing Guidelines, or
would "not otherwise [be] required to be reported that are improperly granted in a manner
that has become prevalent in the district or with a particular judge." See U.S.S.C.
DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 11-12.
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the departure is in violation of the PROTECT Act itself.3 Prosecu-
tors are then required to file a timely notice to preserve the right of
appeal while the government determines whether it will exercise
that right.32 At this point, "Main Justice" reviews the case to
determine if an appeal would be appropriate.33 If "Main Justice" or
a U.S. Attorney determine that an appeal is appropriate and the
Solicitor General approves, DOJ attorneys must "vigorously and
professionally pursue the appeal."34
The DOJ issued a second memorandum regarding PROTECT
Act implementation on September 22, 2003. This memorandum
related to charging and plea bargaining policies of the DOJ and
was intended to make uniform and "rare" the instances in which
the government will accede to downward departures, and then
only when such departures are "supported by the facts and the
law."" Consistent with the memorandum's purpose of ensuring
uniformity in charging practices, the new policy requires that
prosecutors charge and try "the most serious, readily provable
offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of the case" and
that produce the most substantial sentence possible under the
Sentencing Guidelines.3 ' The new policy forbids "fact bargaining"
and "charge bargaining," often referred to as allowing for "hidden
departures." 7 The Attorney General explained that the DOJ would
require that its attorneys adhere to this uniformity in charging
practices in the spirit of upholding uniformity in the application of
the Sentencing Guidelines, just as the PROTECT Act intends. As
the memorandum stated, "U]ust as the sentence a defendant
31. DOJ Attorneys must also provide notification ofan adverse sentencing decision where
the departure either 1) takes place in a case involving sexual abuse or a child victim as
covered by the PROTECT Act, or 2) takes place on remand and does not comply with the
revised requirements for these types of procedures set forth in the PROTECT Act. See id. at
12.
32. See Ashcroft Appeals Memo, supra note 27, at 4.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft, United States Department of
Justice, to All Federal Prosecutors 6 (Sept. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft Charging Policy
Memo] (regarding Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition
of Charges, and Sentencing).
36. Id. at 2.
37. See U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 12-13.
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receives should not depend upon which particular judge presides
over the case, so too the charges ... should not depend upon the
particular prosecutor .... .38 There are limited exceptions to this
policy, including an exception for not pursuing charges under
Department-authorized "'fast track' programs," outlined in a
memorandum sent on the same day.39 In this same vein, any plea
agreement reached "must be fully consistent with the Guidelines...
and with the readily provable facts" about the defendant, including
his "history and conduct."4 ° Prosecutors are also limited in making
sentencing recommendations outside of the Guidelines range.4'
Finally, prosecutors must disclose all relevant facts to the court
that may factor into the Sentencing Guidelines calculation.4 2
These policies implemented by the DOJ were some of the first
direct effects of the PROTECT Act and created a plethora of news
and public criticism, which is discussed below.43
2. The U.S. Sentencing Commission
The U.S. Sentencing Commission has already responded in
numerous ways to the PROTECT Act mandate that the Commission
reduce the incidences of downward departures." As a result of the
PROTECT Act, the Sentencing Commission observed improved
reporting of sentencing data by district courts. Reporting by judges
to the Sentencing Commission is nothing new, but the Sentencing
Commission noted that previous submissions were often incomplete
and often did not provide specific substantive descriptions of the
38. Ashcroft Charging Policy Memo, supra note 35, at 2.
39. See U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 14-15, 14 n.46.
40. Ashcroft Charging Policy Memo, supra note 35, at 5.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See infra Part I.C.
44. The Commission had been "concerned about the increasing incidence of downward
departures" prior to the PROTECT Act and had already taken some actions to amend the
guidelines in order to reduce certain types of downward departures. See U.S.S.C.
DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 16-17. The Commission had taken action in 1999 and
2001 to amend the Sentencing Guidelines to reduce departures based on post-sentencing
rehabilitative efforts, aberrant behavior, and illegal re-entry into the United States-all
areas of concern to the Commission in terms of the number of departures. Id. In addition, the
Commission had already begun to study comprehensively how departures affect the whole
guidelines system. Id. at 17.
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reasons for departure.4" The Sentencing Commission explained that
there is a need for "greater specificity and standardization in
departure documentation" to facilitate the monitoring of decisions
and refining the guidelines as necessary.46 There has been an
increase in the number of sentencing documents received by the
Sentencing Commission and anecdotal evidence has shown that
"courts understand the concerns expressed in the PROTECT Act
and are reacting accordingly."47 As part of its October 2003
emergency amendment pursuant to the PROTECT Act, the
Sentencing Commission also emphasized the need for specific
written reasons for departure decisions to "facilitate appellate
review, and improve the Commission's ability to monitor departure
decisions and refine the guidelines as necessary."4'
The Sentencing Commission took major action to comply with the
specific mandates of the PROTECT Act addressed to them. First,
the Sentencing Commission implemented the "direct congressional
amendments to the sentencing guidelines to restrict the availability
of departures for certain child crimes and sex offenses."49 In
addition, the Sentencing Commission issued a Report to Congress
evaluating departure practices and explaining actions they are
taking to address the issue.5 "
Finally, the Sentencing Commission adopted an emergency
amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines to implement the
PROTECT Act directive that the incidences of downward depar-
tures be "substantially reduced." 1 The amendment eliminated
grounds that had previously been permissible for departures5 2 and
45. See id. at iv, 24-27. The Commission noted that the lack of specificity and
standardization in departure documentation has led to a great deal of analytical difficulty
in conducting studies of the Sentencing Guidelines system. Id. at iv.
46. Id. at iv.
47. Id. at 17.
48. See id. at 20, 79.
49. See id. at 18.
50. See generally id.
51. Id. at 18. In crafting the amendment, the Sentencing Commission conducted a study
of congressional regulation of sentencing as it relates to departures, addressed Congress's
concerns in the PROTECT Act, conducted an empirical study of the most frequently cited
reasons for departures, solicited and considered public comment, and held public hearings
featuring experts from various communities interested in criminal justice. Id.
52. Id. Areas that are now forbidden grounds for departure include the defendant's
acceptance of responsibility for the offense, his aggravating or mitigating role in the offense,
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substantially limited other grounds,53 including limitations on
which types of departures will apply to particular classes of
defendants. 54 This amendment also attempted to impact the use of
departures in a more general manner "by restructuring departure
provisions throughout the Guidelines Manual" 5 5-including the
General Provision on "Grounds for Departure""-to comply more
closely with statutory requirements prescribing when a departure
is appropriate, including the PROTECT Act requirement that the
grounds for departure be stated specifically in writing in the order
of judgment and commitment. 7 The Sentencing Commission
unanimously approved the emergency amendment on October 8,
2003 and it went into effect on October 27, 2003.8 The Sentencing
Commission also plans to continue working on specific areas within
the guidelines that affect the frequency of departures. 9
This section has demonstrated that the PROTECT Act directives
to the Sentencing Commission addressed issues with which they
are previously concerned, including an increasing incidence of
downward departures and insufficient data submissions to study
departure trends. Yet because these reforms came about by
congressional mandate and were not initiated by the sentencing
"experts" on the Sentencing Commission, many have criticized the
October 2003 amendments on the same grounds that criticism of
the Feeney Amendment has been advanced.6 °
the mere choice to plead guilty or enter a plea agreement, the fulfillment of restitution
obligations that are required by law, and any addiction to gambling. Id. at 18-19.
53. Id. at 18. The Sentencing Commission increased restrictions on the availability of
departures for the following grounds: "multiple circumstances ...; the defendant's family ties
and responsibilities ...; victim's conduct; coercion and duress; and diminished capacity." Id.
at 19.
54. Id. at 18. Departure grounds that have been limited in their use based on the status
of the defendant-in terms of the defendant's past offenses-include aberrant behavior and
"over-representation by the defendant's criminal history category of the seriousness of their
criminal history or the likelihood [they will offend again]." Id. at 19.
55. Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted).
56. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2003).
57. U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 20.
58. Id. at 18.
59. Id. at 21 (describing planned continuing efforts by the Sentencing Commission).
60. See infra Part I.C.
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3. The Federal Courts of Appeal
Prior to the PROTECT Act, government appeals of unfavorable
Sentencing Guidelines departure decisions by a district court were
rare. The DOJ attributed this trend in large part to the Supreme
Court's decision in Koon v. United States,6 which established a
deferential standard ofreview-"abuse ofdiscretion"-for appellate
courts reviewing sentencing decisions.62 The DOJ argued that this
deferential standard of review hindered their ability to appeal
downward departure decisions.63 To address congressional concerns
regarding district courts' inappropriate departures and non-
adherence to the guidelines,' Congress sought a more probing
review of the appropriateness of departure decisions. In passing the
Sentencing Reform Act and the PROTECT Act, Congress indicated
that "the courts of appeals are best situated to judge the appropri-
ateness of departures in particular cases."6 5 Congress thus reinvigo-
rated the federal courts of appeals' review power over sentencing
decisions by enacting a de novo standard of review and ensuring
that district courts will re-sentence on remand in accordance with
the findings of the appellate courts.66
The courts of appeals have adhered to the PROTECT Act and
exercised de novo review of appeals of sentencing departure
decisions where appropriate. Many of these cases have come about
as a result of the DOJ's new focus on utilizing the appellate courts'
61. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
62. Id. at 91.
63. U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 55. The government appealed only 25
out of 9,985, or 0.25%, of departures in 2001. Id. at 55-56. Some data on government appeals
pre- and post-Koon, however, suggests that the Koon decision did not substantially change
the number of government appeals. Id. Nevertheless, Congress received testimony that the
standard of review was part of the reason for limited appeals by the government and thus
limited oversight by appellate courts of sentencing departure decisions. Id. at 53-54.
64. Id. at 53.
65. Id. at 53-54. The Sentencing Commission also noted that the Commission is not the
proper organization to conduct a review of the appropriateness of a departure in an
individual case. Id. at 53; see also Andrew D. Goldstein, Note, What Feeney Got Right: Why
Courts of Appeals Should Review Sentencing Departures De Novo, 133 YALE L.J. 1955, 1957-
58 (2004) (arguing that de novo review is appropriate under the federal guidelines sentencing
approach because appellate courts are best situated to make decisions about the guidelines'
meaning and whether departures are appropriate).
66. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 46:731744
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new standard of review and appealing adverse departure decisions,
per the new DOJ policy announced in July 2003.7 The results in the
federal courts of appeals have been mixed. Some appellate courts
have stated that they would affirm or invalidate the decision to
depart upward or downward from the Sentencing Guidelines
range under either the Koon abuse of discretion standard or the
new PROTECT Act de novo review standard.68 Other appellate
courts have employed the de novo standard of review and have
overturned departure decisions, including both upward and
downward departures.69 Still other appellate courts have applied
the de novo standard of review and found that the facts and
applicable law did indeed warrant the departure."
Moreover, the changed scheme of appellate review of sentencing
under the PROTECT Act requires that the district court, when
re-sentencing upon remand, not depart on any grounds that were
not previously stated as a ground for departure and affirmed as
appropriate by the appellate court.71 Having little evidence to the
67. See supra Part I.B.1.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72, 77-78 (2d Cir. 2003); United States
v. Crawford, Nos. 02-4760, 02-4761, 2003 WL 22119928, at *1-2 (4th Cir. Sept. 15, 2003) (per
curiam); United States v. Anderson, 353 F.3d 490,507 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Long
Turkey, 342 F.3d 856, 859-60 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Barragan-Espinoza, 350 F.3d
978, 981 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Andrews, 353 F.3d 1154, 1155-58, 1157 n.3 (10th
Cir. 2003).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Thurston, 358 F.3d 51, 68-78 (1st Cir. 2004); United States
v. Cole, 357 F.3d 780, 782-86 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Phillips, 356 F.3d 1086, 1098-
1101 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Lang, 364 F.3d 1210, 1213-16 (10th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Saucedo-Patino, 358 F.3d 790, 792, 795 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Korman,
343 F.3d 628, 630-32 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Stockton, 349 F.3d 755,764-65 (4th Cir.
2003); United States v. Mallon, 345 F.3d 943, 945-50 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Willey,
350 F.3d 736, 738-39 (8th Cir. 2003).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Daychild, 357 F.3d 1082, 1104-08 (9th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Blas, 360 F.3d 1268, 1270-73 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Frazier, 340 F.3d
5, 13-15 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Clement, No. 0304605, 2003 WL 22682978, at *2
(4th Cir. Nov. 14, 2003) (per curiam); United States v. Archambault, 344 F.3d 732, 735-37
(8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Pressley, 345 F.3d 1205, 1209-11, 1215-18 (lth Cir. 2003).
71. See supra text accompanying note 13 (describing the requirements of a district court
on remand). But see Tracy Friddle & Jon M. Sands, 'Don't Think Twice, It's All Right:
Remands, Federal Sentencing Guidelines & the ProtectAct-A Radical "Departure"?, 36 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 527,527-29,541-49 (2004) (arguing that the PROTECT Act does not limit the options
of a judge re-sentencing on remand as much as a literal reading of the language would
suggest because of established doctrines related to federal sentencing remands that allow
judges to consider grounds for departures that fit within the "limited sentencing approach").
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contrary at this point, one can only assume that district courts are
complying with this mandate. Yet there are two interesting cases
in which district judges have expressed their dissatisfaction with
the changes wrought by the PROTECT Act and the concomitant
de novo appellate review of sentencing decisions. In one case a
judge recused himself from the case and would not impose a
sentence, citing his disinclination to "mechanically impose a
sentence, previously prescribed by the Court of Appeals [annulling
the judge's previous downward departure]" that the judge believed
was clearly contrary to the intent of the Sentencing Guidelines
based on the judge's understanding of the complex facts of the
case.7 ' Another judge grudgingly imposed a sentence mandated by
the court of appeals but wrote a lengthy "Dissent Upon Imposition
of Sentence" explaining his disagreement with the current applica-
tion of the Sentencing Guidelines to sentencing courts such that
they usurp the courts' discretion to depart.73
C. Response to and Criticism of the Feeney Amendment
1. Congressional Support and Critiques
The legislative history of the Feeney Amendment is limited, as
there were few hearings and no lengthy floor debate on the
sentencing reforms it proposed.74 The main reasons that congressio-
nal supporters75 cited for the sentencing reforms, however, were
72. United States v. Thurston, 286 F. Supp. 2d 70,71-72 (D. Mass. 2003) (memorandum
and order of recusal).
73. United States v. Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1018-19 (D.N.D. 2003) (dissent upon
imposition of sentence).
74. For a complete discussion of the legislative history of the PROTECT Act and
sentencing reform in general, with an emphasis on departures, see generally U.S.S.C.
DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, app. B.
75. See Tom Feeney, Editorial, Rights and Wrongs in Sentencing Guidelines, WASH. POST,
Apr. 7, 2004, at A30 (citing a fifty percent increase in non-immigration, non-substantial
assistance departures from FY 1996 to FY 2001 as part of the impetus behind his
sponsorship of the amendment). One of the other key supporters of the Feeney Amendment
and the sentencing reforms was the DOJ. See Letter from Jamie Brown, Acting Assistant
Attorney General for Legislative Affairs, DOJ, to House-Senate Conference Committee on
S.151, reprinted in 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 355 (2003) (expressing support for the Feeney
Amendment, urging that it be included in the final conference bill, citing evidence of the
problem with increasing downward departures, and addressing many of the policy concerns
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concerns over the increasing rate of downward departures overall
-particularly since the Supreme Court's decision in Koon v. United
States-and concerns over the disparate use of downward depar-
tures.v6 Members of Congress were also concerned that the increas-
ing use of downward departures was undermining the goals of the
Sentencing Reform Act, especially the aspiration toward certainty
and uniformity in sentencing.77 Furthermore, supporters of the
Feeney Amendment, including Representative Feeney, expressed
concern that sentencing courts were not faithfully following the
Sentencing Guidelines and were using departures inappropriately,
thereby creating wide disparities in sentencing.78 The anxiety over
increased downward departures was most acute among members
of Congress in cases involving sex crimes against children.79 The
Feeney Amendment passed the House by a vote of 357 to 58, and
the House version of the PROTECT Act by a vote of 410 to 14.80 A
conference version of the PROTECT Act was passed by a vote of 400
to 25 in the House and 98 to 0 in the Senate.8'
Opponents in Congress criticized the factual basis underpinning
the amendment by claiming that inappropriate departures were not
that opponents to the bill expressed); see also Ashcroft Appeals Memo, supra note 27, at 1
(expressing DOJ support for the PROTECT Act and the Feeney Amendment).
76. See U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, app. B at 28-29 (describing
Congressional statements about sentencing departure problems); see also Christian Harlan
Moen, Protect Act Amendment 'Intimidates' Judges, Critics Say, TRIAL, May 1, 2004, at 12
(quoting a January press release by Rep. James Sensenbrenner (R-WI)---"a criminal
committing a federal crime should receive as much punishment regardless of whether the
crime was committed in Richmond, Virginia or Richmond, California" and "[the Guidelines]
were established to address sentencing departures, yet the increasing frequency of downward
departures was undermining sentencing fairness throughout the federal system").
77. See U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 7.
78. See id. app. B at 30-31. Representative Feeney, when introducing the bill, voiced just
this concern, stating: "Unfortunately, judges in our country all too often are arbitrarily
deviating from the sentencing guidelines enacted by the United States Congress based on
their personal biases and prejudices, resulting in wide disparity in sentencing." See 149
CONG. REC. H2423 (daily ed. Mar. 27,2003) (statement ofRep. Feeney); see also Tom Feeney,
Reaffirming the Rule of Law in Federal Sentencing, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, July 1, 2003, at 2.
Senator Hatch, speaking in support of the final conference bill, voiced a similar concern. 149
CONG. REC. S5115 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (declaring that
sentencing courts "have strayed further and further from [the Sentencing Guidelines] system
of fair and consistent sentencing over the past decade").
79. See U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, app. B at 29.
80. Id. app. B at 31.
81. Id. app. B at 33.
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a pervasive problem and by noting that the government itself
initiated many downward departures.8 2 Critics also decried the
haste with which supporters added the amendment to the PRO-
TECT Act, as well as the limited hearings and debate on the issue.83
Additionally, they advanced arguments that judicial discretion to
depart in sentencing was absolutely necessary and crucial to the
sentencing system.' Members of Congress also argued that the
reporting provisions of the Feeney Amendment presented a
serious encroachment on judicial independence and the separation
of powers principle, 5 and would inappropriately interfere with
sentencing by federal judges.8 6 Finally, opponents of the Feeney
Amendment have introduced a new bill, entitled the Judicial Use
of Discretion to Guarantee Equity in Sentencing Act of 2003, or
"JUDGES Act,"87 that intends to repeal all provisions in the
PROTECT Act that are collectively referred to as the Feeney
Amendment-the sentencing reforms that alter guidelines sentenc-
ing and that do not deal specifically with the exploitation of
children.88 These bills were referred to the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees, but no further action has been scheduled on
them. 9
2. Public Critiques: The Press, Academia, and Public Interest
Groups
Opposition to the Feeney Amendment outside of Congress was
swift and in some cases fierce. The press and a wide array of
interest groups (or collections of like-minded citizens) wrote letters
82. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S5113-1, 55119 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S5145 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(arguing, as the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, that the reporting provisions
would create a "hit list" of judges who stray from the guidelines and would "take a sledge
hammer to the concept of separation of powers").
86. See 149 CONG. REC. H3060-61 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Rep. Jackson-
Lee).
87. S. 1086, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2213, 108th Cong. (2003).
88. See U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, app. B at 33 n.197.
89. Id.
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to Congress that derided the Feeney Amendment as an ill-conceived
attack on the discretion of judges, discretion that judges have
traditionally-and certainly since Koon v. United States-used in
deciding to depart downward from the guidelines. 90 Some critics
lamented the limited public debate on the issue and the fact that
Congress failed to consult sufficiently with sentencing "experts,"
such as the U.S. Sentencing Commission and federal judges, prior
to the passage of the law.9 ' Others simply used the passage of the
90. The interest groups coming forward to voice their opposition to Congress were
diverse. For example, former Sentencing Commissioners and current members of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission wrote to express concern over the process by which the amendments
were enacted. See Letter from All Past and Present Chairs of the Sentencing Commission,
to Orrin Hatch, Chairman, and Senator Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, of the Senate
Judiciary Committee (Apr. 2, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Sentencing Chairs'
Letter]; Letter from Chairs of U.S. Sentencing Commission to Senator Orrin Hatch,
Chairman, and Senator Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, of the Senate Judiciary Committee
(Apr. 2, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Sentencing Commissioners' Letter]. In
addition, groups representing lawyers, law professors, and criminal defendants weighed in
against the amendment on various grounds. See, e.g., Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr.,
President, American Bar Association, to Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Senate Judiciary
Committee (Apr. 1, 2003) [hereinafter ABA Letter]; Letter from Thomas W. Hillier, II,
Federal Public Defender, Western District of Washington, on behalf of Federal Public and
Community Defenders, to Senator Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, and Orrin Hatch,
Chairman, of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Mar. 28, 2003) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Public Defenders' Letter]; Letter from Seven Former Assistant U.S. Attorneys
in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, to Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman, and
Senator Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Apr. 7, 2003)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Former U.S. Attorneys' Letter]; Letter from Seventy Law
Professors, to Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman, and Senator Patrick Leahy, Ranking
Member, of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Apr. 2, 2003) (on fie with author) [hereinafter
Law Professors' Letter]. Various other interest groups, including civil rights and pro-business
interest groups, also voiced opposition to the Feeney Amendment. See, e.g., Press Release,
Cato Institute, Federal Sentencing Guidelines in Amber Alert Bill Is Terrible Idea (Apr. 7,
2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cato Institute Press Release]; Letter from Hillary 0.
Shelton, Director, NAACP, to Members of the United States Senate (Apr. 10, 2003) (on file
with author).
91. See Former U.S. Attorneys' Letter, supra note 90 (expressing concern over the
manner in which the Feeney Amendment was enacted); Law Professors' Letter, supra note
90 (expressing concern over limited public debate and hearings on the amendment);
Sentencing Chairs' Letter, supra note 90 (explaining concerns about the lack of input by the
Sentencing Commission to the Feeney Amendment); see also Edward R. Becker, Of Laws and
Sausages, 86 JUDICATURE 7 (July-Aug. 2003) (describing the Feeney Amendment as a poor
piece of lawmaking-a "last minute or stealth" amendment slipped into a popular bill and
then rammed through the Congress without public hearing and little debate); Editorial,
Three Branches, Not Two: Congress Should Reconsider Recent Assaults on Federal Court
Sentencing Discretion, 86 JUDICATURE 276 (July-Aug. 2003) (arguing that although Congress
was within its legislative prerogatives to pass the Feeney Amendment, it should have, as a
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law as an opportunity to describe the Sentencing Guidelines scheme
as unfair and unjust, arguing as a matter of policy that the
sentences that the guidelines provide are too harsh and that
Congress should give judges broader discretion to depart from the
guidelines to create more just sentencesY Many of these criticisms
attacked the Feeney Amendment on the grounds that by limiting
the discretion of federal judges in sentencing, Congress was
attacking the judiciary and the revered concept ofjudicial independ-
ence.
9 3
Others have argued that the real attack on judicial independence
comes in the form of the reporting requirements, which many critics
believe will create a "blacklist" and thus intimidate federal judges.94
matter of policy, consulted the judiciary and the Sentencing Commission prior to passage).
92. See, e.g., Cato Institute Press Release, supra note 90 (arguing the Feeney
Amendment makes a bad Sentencing Guidelines system worse); Patrice Stappert, Comment,
A Death Sentence for Justice: The Feeney Amendment Frustrates Federal Sentencing, 49 VILL.
L. REV. 693, 693-94, 702-06 (2004) (arguing there is a need to have judges use discretion to
allow for compassion and individualized sentences); Ann Woolner, Commentary, Jail Time
by the Book: Is Justice Served When Local Judges Have Little Discretion?, L.A. Bus. J., Sept.
1, 2003, at 39 (arguing that the Feeney Amendment only exacerbates problems in the
sentencing system by eliminating the ability to grant departures and provide justice
appropriate for each individual defendant); cf Frank 0. Bowman, III, Editorial, When
Sentences Don't Make Sense, WASH. POST, Aug. 15,2003, at A27 (arguing that the Sentencing
Guidelines system is not functioning properly, necessitating some departures). But see Paul
G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of
Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1019 (2004) (describing calls by
commentators for greater sentencing "discretion" as actually calls for lower sentences). In
a related vein, some critics argue that the discretion taken from judges has, by operation of
the Sentencing Guidelines and the Feeney Amendment, devolved to prosecutors-a
development they view as granting too much leverage to prosecutors. See, e.g., Stephanos
Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power to Plea
Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295 (2004).
93. See, e.g., ABA Letter, supra note 90; Mark H. Allenbaugh, Who's Afraid of the Federal
Judiciary? Why Congress' Fear of Judicial Discretion May Undermine a Generation of
Reform, CHAMPION, June 2003, at 6 (arguing that the Feeney Amendment attacks the
carefully balanced sentencing reforms enacted since 1984 by usurping the discretion of
judges); Lawrence S. Goldman, The Feeney Amendment, CHAMPION, June 2003, at 4
(consisting of column by the President of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers opposing the Feeney Amendment as part of the "new war on the judiciary" and a
'sneak attack"); James K. Jenkins, Editorial, Give Federal District Judges' Sentencing
Discretion Back, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 9, 2003, at A9 (arguing that this "sneak attack"
on judges will lead to longer sentences-and more sentences-as judges are better situated
to set appropriate sentences); Public Defenders' Letter, supra note 90.
94. See, e.g., Skye Phillips, Note, Protect Downward Departures: Congress and the
Executive's Intrusion Into Judicial Independence, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 947, 1006-16 (2004)
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These critics have focused on the fact that the DOJ supported the
PROTECT Act, and therefore, characterize the sentencing reform
that the Act intends-including the limiting of judicial discre-
tion-as an attack on the judiciary by Attorney General John
Ashcroft.9" This criticism is interesting given that at least one
survey of U.S. attorneys has shown that the new charging policies
implemented at the DOJ in response to the PROTECT Act direc-
tives96 have made little change in the charging and plea bargaining
practices of U.S. Attorneys' offices. Most offices said that the policy
did not cause a major overhaul and wrought only minor changes
from previous practices.97
(arguing that the data collection and reporting provisions in the PROTECT Act interfere with
judicial independence); Editorial, Blacklisting Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2003, § 4, at 10
(characterizing the Ashcroft memo as creating a judicial blacklist and as being part of
Ashcroft's "war" on the federal bench); Stephanie Francis Cahill, Tightening the Reins, ABA
J. E-REPORT, Apr. 4,2003 (arguing that the Feeney Amendment reporting requirements were
designed "to muzzle federal judges"); Patricia Manson, Bar Eyes Threat to Judicial
Independence, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 11, 2003, at 1 (describing a speech by the ABA
President in which he argues that the Feeney Amendment creates a judicial blacklist that
can threaten judicial independence).
95. Many news articles focused on the DOJ PROTECT Act implementation, discussed
supra Part I.B.1, characterizing it as a DOJ campaign against an independent judiciary that
creates a "blacklist" ofjudges. See, e.g., Laurie P. Cohen & Gary Fields, U.S. Prosecutors to
Report, Appeal Short Sentences by Federal Judges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2003, at Al; Eric
Lichtblau, Justice Dept. to Monitor Judges for Sentences Shorter Than Guidelines Suggest,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003, at A12; Edward Walsh & Dan Eggen, Ashcroft Orders Tally of
Lighter Sentences: Critics Say He Wants 'Blacklist' of Judges, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2003, at
A01; Gary Young, Bracing for Ashcroft's Action-Fears of a Black List, Weakened Bench,
NATL L.J., Sept. 29, 2003, at 1. Editorial writers also opined that the Feeney Amendment
was an Ashcroft-led attack on federal judicial independence aimed at consolidating power for
the Executive Branch, sometimes lumping criticism of the PROTECT Act in with general
criticism of Attorney General Ashcroft's policies and the USA PATRIOT Act. See, e.g.,
Editorial, "A Blacklist of Judges," ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003, at 6A; Editorial,
Ashcroft's List, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 18, 2003, at AS; Editorial, Ashcroft
Overreaches, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Aug. 12, 2003, at 14; Editorial, Feeney
Amendment Undermines Judges, NEWS-LEADER (Springfield, Mo.), Aug. 11, 2003, at A5;
Editorial, Judicial Restraint-Ashcroft Should Not Pressure Federal Judges, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Aug. 18, 2003, at B6; Ann B. Kushner, Editorial, Justice Too Large to Be a 1-
Man Show, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 9, 2003, at A13; Editorial, Let Our Judges Judge,
DENV. POST, Aug. 13, 2003, at B06.
96. See supra Part I.B.1.
97. G. Jack King, Jr., USAOs Deny Ashcroft Memo Affecting Plea Bargaining, CHAMPION,
Dec. 2003, at 6 (describing the results of an informal national survey conducted by the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
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3. Federal Judiciary Response
The federal judiciary has voiced its displeasure with the Feeney
Amendment as well.98 The Judicial Conference of the United States
opposed the passage of the Feeney Amendment. Writing to
Congress to express their concerns about the altered appellate
standard of review, both the secretary of the Judicial Conference
and U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist criticized
the loss of discretion to depart downward in sentencing
decisions-arguing it limited both the courts' ability to impose just
and responsible sentences and the reporting requirements identify-
ing specific judges' sentencing decisions, as well as noting the fact
that Congress did not fully consult the judiciary and the Sentencing
Commission for their views on these amendments."
After passage of the PROTECT Act, federal judges continued to
voice their disapproval with the Feeney Amendment's changes to
the sentencing system. Criticism even came from members of the
Supreme Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that although it is
clearly the province of Congress to establish the rules in sentencing
as they did in passing the PROTECT Act, the inquiries into the
sentencing practices of individual judges could threaten judicial
independence if the collection of information goes beyond legitimate
legislative fact finding and is used for political intimidation. 0
98. For an overview ofthe judicial response to the passage ofthe PROTECT Act, see Alan
Vinegrad, The Judiciary's Response to the PROTECT Act, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 8, 2004, at 4.
99. See Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, to Senator Patrick Leahy,
Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Committee (Apr. 3, 2003) (on file with author)
(responding to Senator Leahy's letter and expressing the concerns of the judiciary); Letter
from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Secretary, Judicial Conference of the United States, to
Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee (Apr. 3, 2003) (on file with
author) (opposing several of the sentencing provisions of the PROTECT Act, as they impair
the sentencing system and the ability of the courts to impose just and responsible sentences);
see also Letter from Jerome B. Simandle, Chair of Federal Judges Association, Sentencing
Guidelines Committee, and E. Grady Jolly, President, Federal Judges Association, to Senator
Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee (Apr. 3,2003) (on file with the author)
(urging that the Feeney Amendment be stricken from the PROTECT Act, as it eliminatesjudges' crucial discretion in the application of the guidelines and destroys fifteen years of
work on the Sentencing Guidelines).
100. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Remarks at the Federal Judges Association Board
of Directors Meeting (May 5, 2003), available at http'/www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/
speechessp_05-05-03.html [hereinafter Rehnquist Speech).
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Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy made a speech to the
American Bar Association that included critiques of the Sentencing
Guidelines and the Feeney Amendment. 0' In the speech Justice
Kennedy did not mention the Feeney Amendment specifically but
criticized the U.S. prison and criminal punishment system in
general and expressed his view that, as a policy matter, the federal
Sentencing Guidelines are a large part of the problem.' 2
Since the passage of the PROTECT Act, otherjudges have spoken
out against the Feeney Amendment both to the press0 3 and in their
opinions. ' °4 One federal district judge even resigned his position onthe bench in protest of the Feeney Amendment's restrictions on
101. See, e.g., Editorial, Harsh Sentences Fail America, INT'LHERALDTRIB., Aug. 13,2003,
at 6; Justice Criticizes Sentencing Guidelines, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2003, at A08; Frank J.
Murray, Supreme Court Justice Urges Shorter Sentences; Justice Kennedy Wants Repeal of
Mandatory Sentences After Voting That They Are Constitutional, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 10,
2003, at A01.
102. Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice, Supreme Court ofthe United States, Speech
at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9,2003) (on file with author) (stating
that "our resources are misspent, our punishments too severe, and our sentences too long").
103. See, e.g., Jonathan Groner, Federal Judiciary Opposes Sentencing Change, LEGAL
TiMES, Aug. 25, 2003, at 8 (describing various judges' public opposition); Linda Satter, Judges
in a Stew on Federal Sentencing Guidelines Seen as Too Rigid, Unfair, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Sept. 1, 2003, at 1 (quoting various federal judges voicing opposition to the federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the PROTECT Act reforms).
104. See United States v. Andrews, 301 F. Supp. 2d 607, 608 (W.D. Tex. 2004) (criticizing
limitations on sentencing discretion, noting that the guidelines work well in many cases but
trial judges "familiar with the facts and humanity involved in a particular case must have
some modicum of discretion to depart upwardly or downwardly in those relatively rare
instances where the sentencing guidelines do not work"); United States v. Mendoza, No. 03-
CR-730 ALL, 2004 WL 1191118, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2004) (invalidating the PROTECT
Act Attorney General reporting requirements as presenting a threat to judicial independence
that is "blatently present" and thus violates the separation of powers); United States v. Kim,
No. 03-CR. 413 (RPP), 2003 WL 22391190, at *5-8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2003) (departing from
the guidelines and arguing that the recent changes to the guideline system are "knee jerk"
measures that increase Congress's role in sentencing, thus limiting the ability of the courts
to dispense justice fairly and independently, and possibly making the judiciary subservient
to other branches of government); United States v. Kirch, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1006-07 (D.
Minn. 2003) (refusing to depart in sentencing defendant and claiming that the departure
reporting requirements are an unwarranted attack on the judiciary that have intimidated
the instant judge); United States v. Mellert, No. CR 03-0043 MRP 2003 WL 22025007, at *1-
2 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2003) (mem.) (granting a downward departure based on "aberrant
behavior" and criticizing the PROTECT Act as an attack on judicial independence); see also
supra text accompanying notes 72-73 (describing the negative reactions of some judges in
response to remanded sentencing decisions based on the de novo review of appellate courts
in accord with PROTECT Act mandates).
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judges, writing an opinion piece in a major newspaper to express
his displeasure. °5
Some district judges have implemented special administrative
measures in response to the passage of the PROTECT Act. One
judge has ordered a videotape recording of each sentencing hearing
he conducts in order to ensure that the appellate court exercising
de novo review of his sentencing departures fully understands the
real world situation that a district judge confronts in sentencing
each individual defendant. 106 Two district court judges in the
District of Columbia have altered the instructions they give to
juries. The judges now state that the sentence given in the case of
conviction is not the concern of the jury, but instead is determined
by Congress and the Sentencing Commission-a change from the
standard instructions that inform the jury of the judge's discretion
in sentencing.' 7 Another district judge, claiming he is asserting
"legitimate judicial authority" to deny Congress the ability to
examine his sentencing records, has issued a blanket order sealing
all sentencing documents from review except by the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission.0 8
The Judicial Conference of the United States voted in September
2003 to support a repeal of the Feeney Amendment envisioned by
105. See John S. Martin, Jr., Editorial, Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2003, at A31 (resigning judge criticizing the Sentencing Guidelines system as "unjust" and
claiming that the PROTECT Act sentencing reforms are meant to intimidate federal judges);
see also Zachary L. Berman, Judge Martin Leaves Bench Critical of Sentencing Rules,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 15, 2003, at 1 (resigning judge explaining that congressional attempts at
sentencing reform act as a "straightjacket" to federal judges). Another federal district judge
in Pittsburgh resigned in part because of objections to the Feeney Amendment and other
sentencing reforms, which he claims prevent judges from giving out the appropriate
sentences for particular crimes. Leonard Post, Two U.S. Judges Fire at 'Feeney', NAT'L L.J.,
Feb. 9, 2004, at 4.
106. In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (mem.); see also John Marzulli,
Judge Will Tape All His Sentencings, N.Y. DAiLY NEWS, Jan. 30,2004, at 4; Post, supra note
105, at 4.
107. The judges explained that they felt the latter statement is no longer true as a result
of the limitations on discretion that the PROTECT Act sentencing reforms place on them.
Jonathan Groner, Bench Benched, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 22, 2003, at 30.
108. See Editorial, The Ace of Spades, N.J.L.J., Dec. 22, 2003, at 18; Vinegrad, supra note
98, at 4. The judge, expressing his public defiance of Congress's will said, "if Congress wants
to make a deck of cards for the judges like they did for the bad guys in Iraq, then make me
the ace of spades." Vinegrad, supra, at 4.
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the JUDGES Act introduced in Congress. 0' They claim that
Congress should not have passed the Feeney Amendment, severely
limiting federal judges' ability to depart from the Guidelines and
requiring reporting on individual judges, without consultation of
the judiciary. 110
More recently, Chief Justice Rehnquist again spoke out on behalf
of the federal judiciary by criticizing the Feeney Amendment in his
2003 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary."' In that report,
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the "traditional interchange
between the Congress and the Judiciary broke down" 12 with the
passage of the PROTECT Act. Furthermore, he opined that
although it is "the prerogative of Congress to determine" how to
legislate, Congress would have benefitted from hearing the "unique
perspective" of judges on sentencing issues by giving them a
meaningful opportunity to be heard-thereby improving both the
legislative process and the policy." 3 This rebuke of Congress over
the PROTECT Act received a substantial amount of media
coverage"' and led to a variety of critical editorials on the sentenc-
ing restrictions and reporting provisions of the PROTECT Act, with
most voicing fears that "intimidation" will impinge upon an
independent judiciary.15
109. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
110. News Release, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, Judicial Conference Seeks
Restoration of Judges' Sentencing Authority (Sept. 23, 2003), available at
http'//www.uscourts.gov/ PressReleasesjc903.pdf. The Federal Bar Association also wrote
to Congress in January 2004 to express its support for a repeal of the Feeney Amendment
via enacting the JUDGES Act. See Bruce Moyer, FED. LAW., Feb. 2004, at 10.
111. CHIEF JUSTICE WILLuAM H. REHNQUIST, 2003 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY (2004), available athttp'J/www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2003year-
endreport.html [hereinafter 2003 FEDERAL JUDICIARY YEAR-END REPORT].
112. Id.
113. Id. The Chief Justice was disturbed by the "collection of departure information on
individual" judges, cautioning that judges should "not be removed from office for their
judicial acts" and that these reporting provisions could be seen as an inappropriate "effort
to intimidate" judges. Id.
114. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Slams Judiciary Law; Judges Scrutinized
Over Sentencing, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 1, 2004, at 20;Rehnquist Criticizes SentencingRestrictions;
The Chief Justice Chides Congress for Limiting Judges' Ability to Impose Lighter
Punishments, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 2, 2004, at A26.
115. See, e.g., Editorial, Best Justice Has Common Sense, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Jan. 26, 2004, at B5; Nat Hentoff, Editorial, Judges Can't Dispense Justice with Handcuffs
On, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, Jan. 18, 2004, at 38; Editorial, Rehnquist's Good Advice, BOSTON
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The Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, a proponent of
the PROTECT Act, directly responded to the Chief Justice's
criticism. He pointed out that Congress, and specifically the
Judiciary Committee, knew of the views of the federal judiciary and
stated that the disagreement over the PROTECT Act has resulted
not from a lack of communication between Congress and the
judiciary, but rather from a policy disagreement over what a proper
sentencing policy is. 116
4. Summary of the Critiques and the Argument that the Feeney
Amendment Is an Attack on Judicial Independence
This section has demonstrated that there is a wide array of
criticism directed at the Feeney Amendment. Much of the criticism
relates to the sentencing reforms as a poor policy choice, with some
arguing that it makes a bad policy-the Sentencing Guidelines-
even worse. What is more troubling, however, given the delicate
nature of our constitutional system, is the argument that this
legislation was an attack on judicial independence. In general, this
argument proceeds on two fronts. First, many argue that it is the
usurping of discretion, the discretion to depart downward, that is
an attack on judicial independence. The second major critique is
that by requiring reporting on judges who depart from the guide-
lines,judicial independence is impaired. Often these arguments are
advanced by judges and other critics to further their arguments
that the Sentencing Guidelines are a poor policy choice, merely
using judicial independence as a rallying cry for their arguments.
GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2004, at A14; Editorial, Stealing Judges'Power, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12,2004, at
B12; Tom Teepen, Editorial, Rehnquist Calls Congress on Intimidation, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 8, 2004, at B7.
116. Sensenbrenner Statement on Chief Justice Rehnquist's Year-End Report on the
Federal Judiciary, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 1, 2004 (describing numerous public hearings on
sentencing issues over the past few years and an extensive record before Congress to act
upon in passing PROTECT Act; also describing the committee's consideration of the views
of federal judges in passing the law).
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II. DEFINING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Judicial independence is the subject of much discussion and
scholarly debate. It has been the subject of countless academic
articles and symposia worldwide." 7 Both the founders of our
constitutional system and modem commentators alike treat this
subject with great reverence. The first Chief Justice of the United
States, John Jay, stated that "[a] Judicial Controul, general & final,
was indispensible" to our constitutional system."' Likewise,
Alexander Hamilton noted that "[the complete independence of the
courts ofjustice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.""9
Modem commentators have called judicial independence "the most
essential characteristic of a free society" and "the backbone of
American democracy." 2 ° Chief Justice Rehnquist has described
judicial independence as the "crown jewel" of our constitutional
system."' American judges and academics worldwide have touted
the American ideal of judicial independence as crucial to the
concept of American liberty.'
2 2
The reason for this reverence ofjudicial independence is not that
it is viewed as an inherent good. Rather, most would agree that
judicial independence is important because of what it protects: the
rule of law and the freedoms that the Constitution guarantees to
117. Thomas L. Jipping, Legislating from the Bench: The Greatest Threat to Judicial
Independence, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 141, 141 (2001).
118. L. Ralph Mecham, Introduction, Mercer Law Review Symposium on Federal Judicial
Independence, 46 MERCER L. REV. 637,638 (1995) (quoting Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler,
The JudiciaryAct of1789: Political Compromise or Constitutional Interpretation?, in ORIGINS
OF THE FEDERAL JuDICIARY 3 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) (quoting John Jay's Charge to the
Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New York, Apr. 12, 1790)).
119. THE FEDERALISTNo. 78, at 484 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1895).
120. Jipping, supra note 117, at 142.
121. Gerald E. Rosen & Kyle W. Harding, Reflections upon Judicial Independence as We
Approach the Bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison: Safeguarding the Constitution's 'Crown
Jewel", 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 791 (2002).
122. See, e.g., Patricio M. Serna, An Independent Judiciary, 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 747
(2001) (address by New Mexico Supreme Court Justice to the Supreme Court of Chihuahua,
Mexico, espousing the virtues ofjudicial independence and judicial review); see also Jipping,
supra note 117, at 141-42 (describing how the topic of judicial independence has been "the
subject of conferences and publications from Australia to Kenya, Britain to Tanzania, Canada
to Slovakia, and France to Sri Lanka").
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the people. 123 The argument proceeds that in our system of shared
powers, the independent courts serve as a check on the other two
branches of our tripartite governmental system to protect individ-
ual rights.124 James Madison, the principal author of the Constitu-
tion, described judicial independence as indispensable to our
democracy as a guard of the individual rights incorporated into the
Constitution and an "impenetrable bulwark against every assump-
tion of power in the legislature or executive ....,,125 The independent
judiciary has demonstrated its value throughout our history by
protecting individual rights in pivotal cases where it often stood
against the tides of public opinion or the power of the politically
elected branches. Examples include the role of the federal courts in
ending racial segregation, holding Presidents accountable to the
rule of law, according women equal treatment, and protecting the
rights of accused criminals. 26
Given the recognized importance of the concept of judicial
independence, it is important to define what the concept entails.
Yet the concept ofjudicial independence is one that is evolving and
difficult to define precisely.'27 A fair definition ofjudicial independ-
ence at its most basic level is that judges should be allowed to
decide a case "free from pressures or inducements,"12' and free from
123. See Vincent R. Johnson, The Ethical Foundations ofAmerican Judicial Independence,
29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1007, 1007 (2002) (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist's description of
judicial independence as the unique idea, at the time of Founding, "that the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution would be enforced by judges who were independent of the
executive"); Mecham, supra note 118, at 638-39 (arguing that "without a judiciary that
operates independently ... the rights of the citizens under a constitution go unchecked"); J.
Clifford Wallace, An Essay on Independence of the Judiciary: Independence from What and
Why, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241 (2001) (examining the assertion that "justice [and]
human rights guaranteed by the Constitution" would be denied to the people 'without a free
and independent judiciary").
124. See Serna, supra note 122, at 747-48 (arguingthatjudicial independence requires the
judiciary to act as a check on the other branches of government).
125. Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., Preserving Judicial Independence-An Exegesis, 29 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 835, 835-36 (2002) (quoting James Madison, Speech to the House of
Representatives (June 8, 1789), reprinted in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 198, 207
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977)); see also id. at 835-38 (describing judicial independence
as "the most critical barometer" of democratic health and the bulwark of the republic).
126. Johnson, supra note 123, at 1007-08, 1008 nn.3-6.
127. See Wallace, supra note 123, at 241 (describing judicial independence as an evolving
doctrine shaped by societal need).
128. See Mecham, supra note 118, at 638 (footnote omitted).
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acute political pressure in their decision making.12 9 Judicial
independence is best understood, however, by examining the
safeguards our system of government has established to preserve
the independent judiciary.
The first, and most important, guarantee of judicial independ-
ence is Article III of the Constitution, which establishes the
federal judiciary and provides that all judges shall serve "during
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office." 3 ° The framers considered these twin
protections-life tenure and undiminished compensation-as
crucial to maintaining the independence of the judiciary, the "least
dangerous" branch, from encroachment by the more powerful
political branches of government.' 3 ' The framers included this
129. See Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political
Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 697 (1995); see also Archibald Cox, The Independence
of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 565, 566 (1996). Cox describes
judicial independence as implying:
1) that judges shall decide lawsuits free from outside pressure: personal,
economic, or political, including any fear of reprisal; 2) that the courts' decisions
shall be final in all cases except as changed by general, prospective legislation,
and final upon constitutional questions except as changed by constitutional
amendment; and 3) that there shall be no tampering with the organization or
jurisdiction of the courts for the purposes of controlling their decisions upon
constitutional questions.
130. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 1.
131. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.,
1895). The judiciary was considered vulnerable to the political branches, because those
branches wielded substantial powers-the President wielding the power ofthe sword and the
Congress the power of the purse and the ability to create legislation-while the judiciary
wielded no such power. See id. (stating that the judiciary "ha[s] neither force nor will, but
merely judgment"). Hamilton explained that life tenure was necessary for an effective and
independent judiciary:
If ... the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited
Constitution, against Legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford
a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing
will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which
must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty .... That
inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of
individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, can
certainly not be expected from Judges who hold their offices by a temporary
commission.
Id. at 487, 489. Hamilton also argued that the guarantee of undiminished compensation
helped to ensure an independent judiciary, because "in the general course of human nature,
a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will." THE FEDERALIST No. 79,
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guarantee because they had witnessed the lack ofjudicial independ-
ence caused by King George's practice of making"Judges dependent
on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and
payment of their salaries.""8 2 Modern commentators agree that
these baseline protections are the bedrock of the federal courts'
independence and protect judges from political influence and
retribution for unpopular decisions.133
In addition to the baseline Article III protections, history
demonstrates that both the judiciary itself and the political
branches have created additional protections to maintain the
judiciary's independence. The next most cited safeguard ofjudicial
independence is the power of judicial review. Established by Chief
Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison,' this power has been
interpreted as ensuring judicial independence, as it emphasizes the
key role of the judiciary as a safeguard of constitutional rights, even
in the face of action by the political branches that violates those
rights.'35 This judicial review function protects the judiciary as a
whole, and is viewed as a protection of the institutional independ-
ence of the judiciary136-as opposed to decisional independence in
individual cases, which is protected by Article III and other political
protections built up over time. 13 7
at 491 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1895). He argued that leaving the
payment of the judiciary to the will of the Congress would never allow for complete
independence, as the judiciary would be dependent on Congress for "occasional grants" of
"pecuniary resources." Id.
132. Hon. James L. Morse, A Declaration About Judicial Independence, 20 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 731, 732 (2001) (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).
133. See Tracey E. George, Judicial Independence and the Ambiguity of Article III
Protections, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 221, 221-23 (2003); Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence,
Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation
of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 160-61 (2003); Johnson, supra note 123, at 1008; John F.
Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (2001);
Morse, supra note 132, at 731-32; Redish, supra note 129, at 697; Rosen & Harding, supra
note 121, at 792.
134. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
135. See, e.g., Rosen & Harding, supra note 121, at 792 (describing how the power of
judicial review provides institutional independence); Serna, supra note 122, at 747-48
(arguing that judicial review is an essential pillar of our constitutional structure for
protecting individual rights).
136. See Rosen & Harding, supra note 121, at 792.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 130-33; infra text accompanying notes 140-45.
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Federal judges, as noted above, are commonly viewed as having
life tenure, as they serve "during good Behavior."138 Federal judges
are "Civil Officers of the United States;" and, therefore, Congress
may remove them from office only "on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misde-
meanors. " "' Impeachment of federal judges has been extremely
rare and actual conviction after an impeachment is even more rare,
with only twelve judges having been impeached and only six
actually having beenconvicted. 4 °
Furthermore, consistent historical practice has limited impeach-
ment of federal judges to impeachment for reasons other than their
decisions in office or judicial acts. The impeachment and acquittal
of Associate Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase in 1804 first
established this practice. Judge Chase was an extremely partisan
Federalist and was impeached for his actions during the sedition
trial of an anti-Federalist.14 ' Many viewed this impeachment as an
attack by the Republicans in Congress, led by President Jefferson,
on the largely Federalist-appointed federal judiciary.142 The Senate,
however, acquitted Chase, an outcome that many argue has had
lasting significance for the future of judicial independence. Chief
Justice Rehnquist argues that the significance of this moment in
our "unwritten constitutional law" was that it established the
political principle that Congress should not use impeachment to
remove judges forjudicial acts.143 Other commentators have reached
the same conclusion on this unwritten political limitation of the
138. U.S. CONST. art. IlI, § 1.
139. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 4.
140. See George, supra note 133, at 226 n.22 (noting only 1 of 108 Supreme Court Justices
has been impeached, and he was acquitted; only 11 out of 2,383 District Court judges have
been impeached, and only 6 of them have been convicted).
141. William H. Rehnquist, Political Battles for Judicial Independence, 50 WASH. L. REV.
835, 837-40 (1975).
142. See id. at 840. The Senate had just convicted Federalist judge John Pickering in the
first impeachment proceedings against a federal judge, and many speculated that the
Republican Congress would have impeached more federal judges. Id. at 840-41.
143. See id. at 842. The Chief Justice made this same argument when making a speech
in opposition to the Feeney Amendment, describing the Chase impeachment incident as
setting a "political precedent" that "a judge's judicial acts may not serve as a basis for
impeachment." Rehnquist Speech, supra note 100; see also 2003 FEDERAL JUDICIARY YEAR-
END REPORT, supra note 111 (stating again the principle that judges are not to be removed
from office for their judicial acts).
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impeachment power'" and the types of cases in which impeachment
has been used since the Chase impeachment incident are proof this
limitation has been respected. Almost all of the judges convicted of
impeachment offenses, were removed from office for nonjudicial
acts, including financial improprieties, tax evasion, and perjury. 145
III. THE OVERSTATED THREAT TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Judicial independence has a distinguished history in the proper
functioning of our constitutional system. Various protections have
been codified in the Constitution itself or developed by the political
branches throughout our history. When critics claim that a law or
other action by the political branches is an attack on judicial
independence, therefore, it is rightly taken very seriously. The
remainder of this Note, however, argues that such claims are not
appropriate in discussing the Feeney Amendment. Although many
of the critics, including judges, may disagree with the law as a
matter of policy and may even disagree with the entire Sentencing
Guidelines system-that does not automatically make the law a
violation ofjudicial independence. In fact, our constitutional system
delegates the making of sentencing policy to the body that made the
policy choice in this instance, the legislature.
This section demonstrates that the allegation that the Feeney
Amendment is an attack on judicial independence is overwrought.
Part III.A provides an explanation of the limitations on the concept
of judicial independence, most importantly the limitations that
Congress places on the federal courts consistent with Congress's
constitutional role. In Part III.B, this Note examines how the
Feeney Amendment is an appropriate act of legislative policy and
is consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines system that Congress
created and the Supreme Court approved. Finally, Part III.C
addresses the main concerns of the critics claiming a violation of
144. See, e.g., Geyh, supra note 133, at 165-66 (arguing that a constitutional custom has
developed among the political branches that removing judges for wrong-headed decisions
would be against the concept of judicial independence); Morse, supra note 132, at 734
(describing the Chase impeachment episode as a political event that set a "hands off'
congressional tone for the next 200 years).
145. See Rehnquist Speech, supra note 100 (noting that one of the judges was convicted
by default because he had become a Confederate judge in 1862).
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judicial independence and demonstrates that the concerns raised
are actually not as severe as the critics charge and that the key
tenets of judicial independence are still intact.
A. Judicial Independence Is Not a Talisman: The Role of
Accountability to the Law and Inter-Branch Interdependence
The preceding discussion 4 described the importance of judicial
independence in our constitutional system and the major
protections that it is afforded. The concept engenders broad,
sweeping descriptions, such as the words of Alexander Hamilton,
"[tihe complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly
essential in a limited Constitution."'47 In addition, in reading much
of the scholarly work that advocates a broad view of judicial
independence and much of the commentary regarding the Feeney
Amendment as an "attack on judicial independence," one would
think that the independence guaranteed to the judiciary is complete
and absolute. It seems as if many believe an independent judiciary
is, as one commentator puts it, "the font of justice, the rule of law
and individual rights, if not the font of all good things." 4 ' This
simplistic broad reading of the judicial independence concept,
however, is somewhat naive and, at the same time, inconsistent
with our constitutional system as well as with the goals that an
independent judiciary is designed to preserve. " The judiciary is not
a completely independent branch. Instead, it is accountable both to
the rule of law and to the political branches of the federal govern-
ment.
146. See supra Part II.
147. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 484 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1895).
148. Frank B. Cross, Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J.
195, 195 (2003) (criticizing this simplistic view of treating judicial independence as an
"unalloyed good").
149. See id. at 195, 202.
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1. Judicial Accountability as Accountability to the Law and the
Argument Against Judicial "Policymaking"
A primary limitation on the independence of the federal
judiciary is the judges' duty to decide cases "according to law." 5 ° A
fundamental argument that is often posited against vesting thejudiciary with too much independence is that "policymaking" is a
political decision and, therefore, a role for the political branches,
whereas judges must uphold the law, including key baseline
constitutional protections. Indeed, some have argued that engaging
in policymaking or "legislating from the bench" is itself a major
threat to judicial independence, as it weakens the role of the
judiciary as an independent arbiter of the law. 5'
This fear of an overly independent judiciary is not of recent
vintage. In fact, during the Constitution ratification debates many
prominent Anti-Federalists, including Thomas Jefferson, opposed
the virtues of an independent judiciary under the constitutional
scheme because, according to them, it left little room to check
judicial power.'52 Opponents feared that the independence provided
150. See Cox, supra note 129, at 566-67 (explaining how judges are obligated to decide
cases "according to law--i.e. "according to a continuity of reasoned principle found in the
words of the Constitution, statute, or other controlling instrument"); Manning, supra note
133, at 61 (describing how the historical background for the separation of powers reinforces
the principle that a sharp separation of judicial and legislative powers was designed to limit
judicial discretion and promote governance according to the rule of law); Frances Kahn
Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 625,
630 (1999) (describing judicial independence as a "grant" from the people that judges must
work to sustain by acting in a way "accountable] to the law").
151. See George, supra note 133, at 222-23 (arguing that the greatest threat to judicial
independence comes from judges themselves ruling based on their ideology and ambition);
Jipping, supra note 117, at 158-59 (arguing that judicial restraint-avoidance of"legislating
from the bench'--is crucial to maintaining judicial independence); Rosen & Harding, supra
note 121, at 800, 803 (arguing that "[u]nwarranted judicial forays into the policy arena"
jeopardize the concept of judicial independence and describing the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 as Congress's response to their perception that the judiciary was overstepping its
bounds); Wallace, supra note 123, at 257-58 (arguing that judicial restraint helps to foster
judicial independence by gaining the respect of the citizenry); cf Manning, supra note 133,
at 70 (arguing that the English concept of "equity of the statute"--the granting of great
discretionary powers to judges in applying the law consistent with the judge's conception of
reason-is inconsistent with the separation of powers ideal in our constitutional system).
152. See Rosen & Harding, supra note 121, at 793-94 (describing opposition to the
expansive view of the independent judiciary under the Constitution by "Brutus," author of
an Anti-Federalist essay, and Thomas Jefferson, writing in a letter in 1821 to Charles
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to the judiciary via the Article III protections would make them
superior to the legislature, usurp the rights and powers of the
states, and lead to a potentially omnipotent judicial branch-thus
negating the key purpose of the separation of powers concept,
avoiding any single all-powerful branch. 5 '
As one commentator has opined,
[t] o the public ... judicial cries of invasions of their independence
that are directed largely at legitimate institutional mechanisms
of accountability sound curiously like a power struggle rather
than an aspirational statement about the role of ourjudiciary in
our system of government. The notion that established mecha-
nisms of institutional accountability to the political branches ...
constitute infringement on appropriate judicial authority is
potentially a very hazardous perspective for the judiciary.5
This concept-that policymaking is not the province of the
judiciary-is vitally important in evaluating many of the claims
that the Feeney Amendment invades judicial independence by
limiting the discretion of judges. Given that many of these argu-
ments concern the merits of the Sentencing Guidelines system
or Congress's decision to limit downward departures, they are in
fact arguments about legislative policy choices. There is a danger,
therefore, that arguments decrying an attack on judicial independ-
ence on these grounds may be misplaced. The next section of this
Note explains another limitation on judicial independence: the
mechanisms in the constitutional system holding the judiciary
accountable to the people via institutional accountability to the
political branches.
2. Constitutional Accountability: The Accountability of the
Federal Judiciary to the Political Branches
The independence of the judiciary is further constrained by the
Constitution, the very same document that grants the judiciary its
most powerful protections. Although Article III grants life tenure
Hammond).
153. See id.
154. Zemans, supra note 150, at 630.
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and undiminished pay to the judiciary to preserve independence, it
also gives a variety of tools, some very powerful, to the political
branches to act as a check to hold the judiciary accountable.155 The
first of these tools is the power to control the membership of the
courts via appointment ofjudges, which by Article II is given solely
to the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate.'56
Greater powers for regulation of the federal courts were given to
Congress in terms of regulation of the courts' administration and
jurisdiction, as well as the substantive rules of decision to be
applied. These powers are remarkably potent.
Congress has the power over creation and abolition of the federal
courts. Initially, the Constitution gave Congress the choice whether
to establish lower federal courts at all and the concomitant power
to abolish the lower federal courts if it so chose.'57 Moreover,
Congress has a large amount of control over the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, including the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
155. See Cross, supra note 148, at 205-10 (describing the manner in which the judiciary
is held accountable to the political branches); Redish, supra note 129, at 697-98 (describing
how the Framers of the Constitution made "pragmatic balances," as they did elsewhere in
the Constitution, by giving the judiciary a large amount of independence under Article I,
while simultaneously limiting that independence by granting Congress a broad power of
regulation over the federal courts). Congress also has the power to impeach federal judges,
and some have argued that this power is one of the means by which Congress can control the
judiciary. See Cross, supra note 148, at 205. Yet the idea that impeachment should be used
only to remove judges for misconduct, not for their decisions in office or for political acts, has
developed over time and has become a consistent political practice. See supra notes 141-45
and accompanying text.
156. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Many commentators have noted that this power may also
serve as a source of the political branches' influence over the federal judiciary, either in
terms of a judge seeking an original appointment through the political process or a
subsequent appointment to a higher court via the same process. See Cross, supra note 148,
at 207-08 (describing how the desire for promotions renders judges accountable to other
branches of the government); Rosen & Harding; supra note 121, at 802-03 (describing how
the judicial nomination and confirmation process can lead to the potential for political
influence on decisions).
157. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 ('The Congress shall have Power .... To constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court ...."); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power
of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."). This text and generally accepted
constitutional history establish that Congress was not required to establish the lower federal
courts. Redish, supra note 129, at 697 n.2. The Supreme Court has also reasoned that the
power to create these courts includes the power to abolish them. See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319
U.S. 182, 187 (1943); see also Redish, supra note 129, at 697-98 n.2 (discussing the Supreme
Court's subsequent reading of Lockerty).
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Court in many types of cases.15 Article III defines the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a limited way-"all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be a Party"-and provides for Congress
to limit its appellate jurisdiction.'59 The most striking example
of this power is Ex Parte McCardle,6 ° an 1868 case involving a
statute that Congress passed, over a Presidential veto, that
repealed Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear cases involving
habeus corpus brought under an act passed in 1867.161 The Supreme
Court dismissed the already argued and pending case for want of
jurisdiction, noting that under Article III Congress had the power
to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and Congress appropriately exercised that power in this
instance by passing the 1868 repealing act.'62 Additionally, Article
III provides no jurisdiction for the lower courts except that which
Congress provides.'
63
Although Article III protects judges by providing undiminished
compensation, Congress still exerts a great deal of control over the
federal courts by its control of the purse strings of the government,
making the judiciary dependent on the legislature for much of its
sustenance. 164
Congress has exercised these powers extensively since the
Founding, beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1789, by which
158. See Cross, supra note 148, at 206-07; Redish, supra note 129, at 697-98, 697 n.2.
159. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2 ("[The supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction
... with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."). This
language has been construed over time to allow Congress to establish and alter the
jurisdiction of the federal courts (aside from the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court)
including the jurisdiction of the district courts and courts of appeal. See Cross, supra note
148, at 206-07; Mecham, supra note 118, at 640; Redish, supra note 129, at 697-98 n.2.
160. 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 506 (1868).
161. Id. at 507-08.
162. Id. at 513-14.
163. See supra note 159.
164. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 148, at 207 (describing how Congress's control ofjudicial
administrative budgets and resources can serve as an accountability mechanism); Mecham,
supra note 118, at 639-41 (describing the "interdependence" of the judiciary as a result of
congressional control over jurisdiction and resources); Rosen & Harding, supra note 121, at
800-01 (describing Congress's use of its power of the purse in its attempts to control the
judiciary).
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Congress first created the federal court system. 16 5 In the two
hundred plus years since, Congress has enacted what the Federal
Judicial Center describes as twenty-one statutes that are funda-
mental to the structure of the judiciary and its authority.166 These
statutes cover topics such as creating various kinds of courts,
expanding and reorganizing circuits and courts of appeals, and
providing administrative support agencies for the federal courts. 67
In addition, Congress exercised its constitutional powers to define
the courts'jurisdiction and provided for rules and procedures in the
courts.1
68
Congress's most important power over the federal courts is
making substantive law that provides the framework for the
decisions of the courts. Under Article I, Congress has the power "to
make all laws ... necessary and proper for carrying into Execution"
the powers enumerated to Congress and "all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States"--thus
establishing the legislature as the sole branch with the wide
discretion to make legislative policy choices. 69 In creating the laws,
Congress thereby provides the substantive rules of decision in the
federal courts-rules that the unelected federal judiciary has no
authority to ignore or alter.7 0
There are limitations on Congress's broad power to provide
substantive rules of decision by law. Most importantly, the courts
may disregard a congressionally created rule of decision and use the
power ofjudicial review to strike down a law that violates constitu-
tional protections, such as due process or equal protection. 171
Additional areas of substantive constitutional restrictions on
Congress's lawmaking power occur in the area of criminal lawmak-
165. See Federal Judicial Center, Federal Judicial History, at httpJ/www.0c.gov/history/
home.nst'page/legislationbdy (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
316, 406-10, 419-21 (1819) (explaining that the Necessary and Proper Clause must be
interpreted broadly, as it was included in the Constitution to give Congress a broad range
of discretion in choosing what laws it would enact in order to execute its legitimate
constitutional powers); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES § 3.2 (2d ed. 2002).
170. Redish, supra note 129, at 715.
171. Id.
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ing. Federal courts may use the power of judicial review to invali-
date criminal statutes that violate the prohibitions on bills of
attainder and ex post facto laws, 7 2 that attempt to re-define the
crime of treason, 171 that create certain kinds of punishment for
treason, 174 and that inflict cruel and unusual punishment.175 Also,
Congress may pass substantive rules of decision that apply
generally to all cases. Congress may not pass a law that is directed
at adjudicating specific litigation before the courts, however, as
such action violates the principle of separation of powers. 71 An
example of the Supreme Court applying this separation of powers
principle to invalidate a law that Congress passed was the post-
Civil War case of United States v. Klein. 77 In that case, the Court
found Congress's law unconstitutional and held that Congress had
overstepped its role within the separation of powers framework
because it went beyond creating "such exceptions from the appellate
jurisdiction" as it may find appropriate 78 and instead passed a law
mandating the Court's resolution of a specific case.
17
172. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
173. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (' Treason against the United States, shall consist only
in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.
No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the
same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.").
174. U.S. CONST. art. m, § 3, cl. 2 ("[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the life of the Person attainted.").
175. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also infra notes 236-56 and accompanying text
(discussing current challenges to the Sentencing Guidelines on Sixth Amendment grounds).
176. The Supreme Court described the Klein decision as creating a principle, based on
Article I, forbidding legislation that "prescribe[s] rules of decision to the Judicial
Department of the government in cases pending before it." Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (quoting United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871))
(holding that the statute did not violate this principle but violated Article I for other
reasons). Some commentators opine that the lesson of Klein is that if Congress passed
legislation directed at resolution of a particular case pending before the Court, it would
violate both the formalist model and functionalist model of separation of powers, because it
would involve Congress performing a judicial function or unduly interfering with the judicial
function, respectively. Redish, supra note 129, at 718-20. An alternative reading of the Klein
decision is that the statute was held to be an unconstitutional legislative act, because it
instructed the Court on how it should perform constitutional interpretation-the
interpretation of the President's pardon power-and thus violated separation of powers. Id.
at 720.
177. 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 128 (1871).
178. This type of action would have been permissible under Ex Parte McCardle. See
supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of this principle.
179. Klein, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 145-48.
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In light of this delineation of the lawmaking and the judicial
power, it is fair to say that our federal judiciary is "'independent at
retail, not at wholesale'-making the courts independent in
particular cases but not so independent as to change the fundamen-
tal content of the law."' In order to be an appropriate use of
legislative power, therefore, the Feeney Amendment must fit
properly within the congressional power to regulate the federal
courts, which includes the power to make substantive rules of
decision for these courts by passing laws of general applicability.
The next section of this Note explains how the Feeney Amendment
meets this standard.
B. The Feeney Amendment as an Appropriate Act of Legislative
Policy
No argument has been advanced that the Feeney Amendment
itself violates either the substantive constitutional prohibitions
on Congress' lawmaking power.8 ' or the United States v. Klein
principle.8 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a speech ostensibly in
opposition to the Feeney Amendment, noted that even though
judicial independence does require that judges not be impeached for
judicial acts, that "does not mean that Congress cannot change the
rules under which judges operate. Congress establishes the rules to
be applied in sentencing; that is a legislative function."1'8 What the
180. Cross, supra note 148, at 213 (noting that this conception ofjudicial independence is
also consistent with the practice of striking down laws as unconstitutional-a key role of the
independent judiciary-as the rarity of that practice shows that the judiciary is not intent
on a wholesale overhaul of the nation's laws).
181. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional limitations
on Congress's substantive lawmaking power). In United States v. Vizcaino, the court rejected
procedural and substantive due process challenges to the Sentencing Guidelines, holding that
restrictions on "discretionary individualized sentencing" in non-capital cases were not a
denial of due process. 870 F.2d 52, 54-57 (2d Cir. 1989).
182. The Feeney Amendment is not directed at a specific case but rather is a substantive
rule of general applicability. Cf supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text. There have been,
howver, some recent constitutional challenges to the Sentencing Guidelines system as a
whole on Sixth Amendment grounds, and a Supreme Court decision is forthcoming on this
issue. See infra notes 236-56 and accompanying text.
183. Rehnquist Speech, supra note 100.
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Chief Justice recognized was the same principle the Supreme
Court recognized in Mistretta v. United States."4
In Mistretta, the Court recognized that sentencing has never been
within the exclusive authority of one branch but noted that
Congress "has the power to fix the sentence for a federal crime ...
and the scope of judicial discretion with respect to a sentence is
subject to congressional control."'85 Furthermore, the Court noted
that the genesis of the Sentencing Guidelines was dissatisfaction
with judges' unfettered discretion under the pre-Guidelines
sentencing system, leading to great variation in the sentences
imposed upon similarly situated defendants and an uncertainty
about how long they would spend in prison."' The Sentencing
Guidelines are thus aptly described as "'a constitutional mechanism
for channeling the discretion that a sentencing court would
otherwise enjoy' in the absence of the Guidelines."'87 Since
Mistretta, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the validity
of the Sentencing Guidelines and their binding nature on the
federal courts, 88 as well as Congress's primacy as the driving force
behind the Sentencing Guidelines.'89
184. 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the validity of the Sentencing Guidelines and the
Sentencing Commission against challenges that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which
created both, violated the nondelegation doctrine and separation of powers).
185. Id. at 364. The Mistretta Court noted that even in the old "indeterminate-sentenc[ing]
system" Congress still had a fair degree of control over sentencing, as it set the range of
punishment for each federal crime. Judges, however, were allowed to grant probation if they
saw fit. Id. at 365.
186. Id. at 365.
187. United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192, 201 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v.
Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 244 (3d Cir. 2000) (Becker, C.J., concurring)).
188. See, e.g., Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36,46-47 (1993) (holding that interpretive
and explanatory Guidelines commentary, as well as the Guidelines themselves, are binding
on federal courts); Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992) (holding that it is the
government's right, not its duty, to file a motion for departure based on substantial
assistance, and that the only inquiry a sentencing court may make is whether refusal to file
a motion violates constitutional protections); Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193,200-02
(1992) (holding that the Guidelines and policy statements accompanying the Guidelines
constrain judges' ability to depart).
189. See United States v. Labonte, 520 U.S. 751, 752-54, 757 (1997) (invalidating a
Sentencing Commission commentary that conflicted with Congressional statutory guidance,
and holding that the Commission's broad discretion must bow to the specific directives of
Congress); see also United States v. Gaines, 122 F.3d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 1997) ("When
Congress and the Sentencing Commission disagree on matters of sentencing policy, Congress
trumps.").
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Many opponents of the Feeney Amendment argue that the
limitation of the discretion of sentencing judges is itself inconsis-
tent with the spirit of the guidelines system. They often cite the
Supreme Court's decision in Koon v. United States,9 ° wherein
the Supreme Court noted that appellate courts should give due
deference to sentencing determinations of the sentencing court and
review them for abuse of discretion.' Yet the Court also noted that
this standard of deference was required, in part, because Congress
had mandated this standard.'92 The Court also noted that sentenc-
ing courts may depart from the guideline sentencing range only in
limited situations.'93 Although the Court did hold in Koon that
limited discretion was left with the sentencing court, in part
because Congress had mandated it, the understanding in Mistretta
that Congress intended to create a much more circumscribed
system of sentencing-as it was authorized to do-is still good
law.' The scheme that the Sentencing Guidelines created, and
that Mistretta validated, was one of "rigid strictures from which
departure would be unusual," aimed to eliminate unwarranted
disparities in sentencing.
95
The Chief Justice, in the speech mentioned above discussing the
Feeney Amendment, reaffirmed the principle that the courts will
generally defer to Congress's determinations on sentencing policy,
stating:
It is well settled that not only the definition of what acts shall be
criminal, but the prescription of what sentence or range of
sentences shall be imposed on those found guilty of such acts, is
190. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
191. Id. at 97-98.
192. Id. at 98.
193. Id. at 93-95 (explaining that departures are warranted only in instances where the
Guidelines, arguably, had not taken into account a particular aggravating or mitigating
factor).
194. See United States v. Gaines, 122 F.3d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1989); supra text accompanying notes 185-89.
195. United States v. DeRiggi, 45 F.3d 713,717 (2d Cir. 1995); see id. at 716-17 (describing
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, its legislative history, and interpretive case law as
demonstrating that the Act intended to create a rigid system in which the courts would find
departures to be rare); Vizcaino, 870 F.2d at 54 (explaining that the principal goal of the
legislation was to reduce unwanted disparities, and that grounds for departure will be
eliminated over time).
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a legislative function-in the federal system, it is for Congress.
Congress has recently indicated rather strongly, by the Feeney
Amendment, that it believes there have been too many down-
ward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines. It has taken
steps to reduce that number. Such a decision is for Congress,
just as the enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines nearly
twenty years ago was. "6
In addition to being a valid exercise of legislative power over
sentencing policy to which the courts traditionally defer,'97 the
Feeney Amendment is also consistent with the original intent of the
guidelines system.
C. This Legitimate Legislative Act of Sentencing Reform Does Not
Destroy Judicial Independence
Setting aside the various policy critiques of the Feeney
Amendment,'98 the remaining critique is that the amendment is
an attack on judicial independence.' 99 Assuming that this is a
proper exercise of legislative control over both the federal courts
and setting sentencing policy,200 the key aspect of the law that still
must be analyzed is if it encroaches upon the independence of the
federal judiciary. Those who believe it does argue that independ-
ence is under attack as a result of the removal of "discretion" in
sentencing by trial judges and as a result of the reporting require-
ments, creating concerns of a judicial blacklist and intimidation of
196. Rehnquist Speech, supra note 100.
197. The Supreme Court has shown deference to state legislatures in establishing
sentencing policy as well. In 2003, the Court upheld states' "three strikes" laws. See Lockyer
v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003). In Ewing, the Court
explained that "[tihough three strikes laws may be relatively new, our tradition of deferring
to state legislatures in making and implementing such important [criminal punishment]
policy decisions is longstanding." Id. at 24. In addition, the Court stated that "[slelecting the
sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not federal
courts." Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
198. These critiques, which criticize the value of departures in the sentencing scheme
overall and the process by which the Feeney Amendment was enacted, are not within the
purview of this Note.
199. See supra Part I.C.4.
200. See supra Parts I.A, mI.B.
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judges.2"' On both fronts much of the concern for the independence
of the judiciary has been overstated.
As an initial matter, the Feeney Amendment leaves untouched
the key structural protections of federal judicial independence,
the constitutional mandates of life tenure and undiminished
compensation.2 2 The Feeney Amendment in no way purports to
alter the structures and processes for judicial termination and
compensation.20 3 The amendment also does not impair another key
tenet of judicial independence-the power of judicial review to
protect individual constitutional rights against the tyranny of the
majority. Most of the criticisms of the Sentencing Guidelines and of
the Feeney Amendment raise issues with the factual underpinnings
of sentencing policy decisions or if the appropriate policy decisions
are being made. When citizens, however, make challenges that the
Sentencing Guidelines or the amendments to them, including the
Feeney Amendment, do violate some fundamental constitutional
right or the separation of powers, the federal courts have not
hesitated to analyze the constitutional claim.20 4 One would infer
201. See supra Part I.C.4.
202. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
203. Some critics have argued that the reporting provisions will be used to create a
"blacklist" ofjudges that could lead to eventual removal or blocking of nominations to higher
federal courts. From a constitutional point of view, this statute does not trammel the
protections ofjudicial independence, as the reporting requirements are not in place to serve
as a review or evaluative tool for individual judges. Instead, Congress is requiring the
collection of information on sentencing decisions and departures by the Sentencing
Commission and by the DOJ to ensure that sentencing policy, specifically departure policy,
is improved and to ensure that the government is taking appropriate appeals of adverse
sentencing decisions.
204. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (analyzing claims that the
Sentencing Guidelines and the creation of the Sentencing Commission violated the
separation of powers); United States v. Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1989) (analyzing
a challenge to the Sentencing Guidelines on due process grounds); United States v.
Schnepper, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1199-1200 (D. Haw. 2004) (ruling on a challenge to the
Feeney Amendment as altering the Sentencing Guidelines to the extent that it violates the
separation of powers); United States v. Mendoza, No. 03-CR-730, ALL, 2004 WL 1191118,
*6-7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12,2004) (ruling on a challenge to the Feeney Amendment). The federal
courts have shown their willingness to address constitutional challenges to the Sentencing
Guidelines system very recently. In the wake of the Supreme Court's June 2004 decision that
invalidated Washington State's sentencing guidelines scheme-a scheme very similar to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines-on Sixth Amendment grounds, many federal district and
appeals courts quickly addressed the applicability of the Supreme Court's newly announced
Sixth Amendment rule to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, with many courts holding the
Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has agreed to decide this issue
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that they would continue to do so if a claim were made that
sentencing policy violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment or violated some other substantive
constitutional prohibitions on Congress's power to make criminal
law,2 °5 although no such claim has been made in the Feeney
Amendment debate.
1. The Difference Between Discretion and Independence
Critics would still protest that the limitations on a sentencing
court's discretion to depart downward are in fact a violation of
judicial independence. Yet this argument is conflating two issues.
Discretion is not the same thing as judicial independence. Judges
clearly have discretion in deciding individual cases and in using the
power of judicial review to protect individual rights free from
outside pressures and inducements-this discretion is protected by
the concept of judicial independence. This discretion, however, is
not unbridled as Congress has the power to set the substantive
rules of decision in the federal courts, °6 including setting the policy
on sentencing. 0 7 By arguing that denying judges some discretion to
depart downward in sentencing is an attack on judicial independ-
ence, critics of the Sentencing Guidelines and the Feeney Amend-
ment may weaken judicial independence by advancing an argument
that judges ought to set policy-the role appropriately of Con-
gress-as opposed to being accountable to the law.20 '
As one self-described "activist" federal district judge said, "If you
asked me if I like the sentencing guidelines ... I'll tell you no, I
don't. I follow them because they're the law, and that's good enough
for me." 0 s The judge went on to note that although the Guidelines
on an expedited basis. See infra notes 236-56 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text (describing the substantive
constitutional limitations on Congress' criminal lawmaking power).
206. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (describing how Congress's
substantive lawmaking power controls the substantive rules of decision in the federal courts).
207. See supra Part III.B (examining how the Feeney Amendment is consistent with
congressional control over federal sentencing policy).
208. See supra Part III.A.1 (describing "accountability to the law" as a check on judicial
independence).
209. Robert H. Merhige, Jr., The Federal Courts: Observations from Thirty Years on the
Bench, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 867, 872, 886-87 (1998) (interview with a federal district judge
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have taken away discretion in sentencing decisions for judges, that
does not mean judicial independence has been eroded, because
"there's a difference in discretion and independence," and "judicial
independence isn't taken away with [the Sentencing Guidelines and
mandatory minimum sentences] ."210 Another federal judge, who has
served on the Sentencing Commission, accurately summed up an
appropriate response to the argument that the Sentencing Guide-
lines' restriction on judges' discretion is a violation of the tenet of
judicial independence.211 She noted, "When Congress acts to curb
the discretion that judges have historically exercised, some judges
have taken the view that those restrictions are also a threat to the
judiciary's independence,"212 an argument that sounds very similar
to the arguments raised against the Feeney Amendment. In
discussing criticism of the Sentencing Guidelines system, she noted
that "what is perceived as a threat to the independence of the
judiciary in curbing discretion is in fact Congress carrying out its
constitutional powers."2"3 The same can be said of the Feeney
Amendment reforms by which Congress has made a policy choice to
alter the sentencing sysytem to reduce the number of downward
departures.
Additionally, much of the argument against the Feeney Amend-
ment focuses on the fact that departures will be eliminated. This is
not entirely true. Judges will still be allowed to depart downward
as long as they clearly state the reasons for the departure in writing
and base the departure on a factor that advances the objectives
of sentencing policy set forth in the guidelines, and as long as
the factor is one justified by the facts of the case.21 4 Only in
cases involving child abduction and child sex offenses is the court
prohibited from departing downward, unless it finds a mitigating
with thirty years of service, conducted as part of a symposium on the federal courts); see also
Michael S. Gerber, A Judge's View, LEGAL AFF., March/April 2004, at 74 (including a letter
from a current federal district court judge praising his lack of discretion under the current
guidelines system because it leads to a fairer, more uniform federal sentencing regime).
210. Merhige, Jr., supra note 209, at 886-88.
211. See Deanell Reece Tacha, Independence of the Judiciary for the Third Century, 46
MERGER L. REV. 645, 654-55 (1995).
212. Id. at 654.
213. Id. at 655.
214. See U.S.S.C. DEPARTURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 9-10 (explaining the PROTECT
Act revisions of permissible reasons for reversal of a sentencing decision).
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circumstance of a kind or a degree affirmatively and specifically
identified as a permissible ground for departure.21 Furthermore,
the fact that much of the discretion to depart that district courts
previously enjoyed may now be reviewed de novo by the federal
courts of appeals does not mean that the independence of the
federal judiciary as a whole is imperiled, as a higher federal court
will still make decisions on the appropriateness of the sentencing
decision. 21" The federal courts of appeals have also interpreted
narrowly the PROTECT mandate to review departure decisions de
novo, holding that it applies only to decisions to depart and not to
a judge's decision not to depart.217
2. Fears of a "Judicial Blacklist" as a Threat to Judicial
Independence Are Overstated
Many critics of the Feeney Amendment point to the reporting
requirements it creates 218 and fear that there will be a judicial
"blacklist" or "hit list" of judges who do not adhere to the govern-
ment's desired sentence.219 Chief Justice Rehnquist alluded to such
a concern in his speech criticizing the Feeney Amendment. 22' After
describing the Samuel Chase impeachment and the political
precedent arising out of it that "a judge's judicial acts may not
serve as a basis for impeachment,"221 the Chief Justice went on to
caution that, although Congress may have a legitimate interest in
collecting departure information to legislate effectively, the
collection of information on individual judges' sentencing practices
215. See id.
216. See United States v. Phillips, 346 F.3d 846, 861 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the
power to determine the appropriateness of individual departures remains with the judiciary
and thus the PROTECT Act de novo standard of review does not violate the separation of
powers). Early indications show that, since the passage of the PROTECT Act, federal courts
have not been uniformly reversing departure decisions; rather, that the results have been
mixed. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
217. See United States v. Linn, 362 F.3d 1261, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 2004).
218. See supra notes 18-20, 22-25, 28-34, 45-48 and accompanying text (describing the
reporting provisions contained in the Feeney Amendment and the implementation related
to those provisions by the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the DOJ).
219. See supra Part I.C (describing this critique as coming from the press, opponents of
the Feeney Amendment in Congress, and the federal judiciary).
220. Rehnquist Speech, supra note 100.
221. Id.
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could, if used improperly, "intimidate individual judges in the
performance of their judicial duties" and thus infringe upon judicial
independence.222 Even though this is a legitimate concern, the
implementation of the Feeney Amendment to date and the tradi-
tional public role of federal judges mitigate this concern.
The most draconian reporting provisions that Congress imposed
upon the DOJ, those that require reporting to Congress each time
a judge departs from the guidelines, were obviated by the manner
in which the DOJ has responded to the Feeney Amendment. The
DOJ has revamped charging and appeal policies, and requires
internal reporting of adverse downward departure decisions in
order to determine if an appeal is necessary.22 3 Although this appeal
decision reporting process will include the name of the sentencing
judge, it would be ridiculous not to, as it is that judge's decision that
is being appealed. There has been no suggestion that, in deciding on
whether to appeal any case, the government should somehow
redact the name of the district judge who presided over the trial, as
knowing the name of the judge making the decision does not violate
judicial independence. Additionally, the more stringent require-
ments on reporting to the Sentencing Commission and to the court
of appeals, via requiring judges to write the reasons for departure
in the written order of judgment and commitment, serve valid
purposes. 24 Without this information, it would be very difficult for
an appellate court to properly render judgment on the merits of the
departure. As for the reports to the Sentencing Commission, as
noted above, reporting of sentencing information to the Commission
in order to improve the functioning of the system is nothing new.225
In addition, the Sentencing Commission has already noted that the
increased detailed information that the PROTECT Act requires is
having a salutary effect on their ability to analyze the departure
phenomenon.226
222. Id.; see also 2003 FEDERAL JUDICIARY YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 111 (alluding to
this same concern again in criticizing the Feeney Amendment).
223. See supra Part I.B.1 (describing the DOJ implementation ofthe Feeney Amendment).
224. See supra notes 18-20, 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing reporting to the
Sentencing Commission); see also supra text accompanying notes 9, 57 (discussing the
requirement for a written order ofjudgment and commitment on appeal).
225. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
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Much of the concern regarding the reporting provisions stems
from the use of individual judge's names. This critique seems overly
dramatized when one looks at the traditional role of a federal judge.
A federal judge is an officer of the United States and conducts
much of his business in the public eye. With the exception of in
camera proceedings held for security and other reasons, a federal
court is a transparent body. Ajudge writes and issues opinions that
are published for all to read and holds hearings and trials, for the
most part, in a courtroom open to the public. It seems odd, there-
fore, that critics fear judges will be intimidated by their names
being associated with their sentencing decisions, as their names
always have been associated with all of their decisions.22
When one reads a published opinion of a court of appeals
reviewing a sentencing decision, at the outset it clearly states the
identity of the sentencing judge-just as it does when an appeals
court reviews any decision of a lower court. In addition, when courts
render key opinions or decisions in high profile cases, the media
widely reports the decision, often including the name of the judge.
Some federal judges and others have noted this fact when analyzing
the claim that the reporting of individual judges names will serve
to intimidate them.228 For example, one federal district judge in
Utah wrote an opinion in support of the contention that a down-
ward departure was appropriate in one particular case even in light
of the Feeney Amendment, saying, in reference to concerns about
the intimidation of judges by these reporting requirements,
[TIhe overriding fact remains that judicial departure decisions
(like any other judicial action) are already matters of public
record. This court's sentencing decisions, for example, are all
easily available both in the court's public files and on an
internet website .... In any event, since the suggestion has been
227. See F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Remarks Before the U.S. Judicial Conference
Regarding Congressional Oversight Responsibility of the Judiciary, 87 JUDICATURE 202
(2004) (expressing view that Congress may, constitutionally, obtain and review the public
records of the judicial branch, and arguing that federal judges are given life tenure so that
they can better withstand public scrutiny and criticism).
228. See Dan Herbeck, Elfbin Faces Scrutiny Over Lenient Sentences, BUFF. NEWS, Sept.
5, 2003, at C1 (quoting the Chief Judge of the Western District of New York commenting on
the DOJ reporting and appeal polices: "Everything I do in the courtroom is already open to
public scrutiny.... If someone wants to report to Washington or appeal one of my sentences,
they have the right to do that.").
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raised, this court wishes to observe that it is not concerned
about close scrutiny of its downward (or upward) departure
decisions by Congress, the public, or otherwise.229
Others have pointed out that the bedrock Article III constitutional
protections of life tenure and undiminished compensation ensure
that changes to the sentencing process will not intimidate federal
judges.230
Another federal judge, in ruling that the PROTECT Act alter-
ations to the sentencing system were constitutional in response to
a separation of powers challenge, found that the limitations on
discretion to depart and the reporting provisions of the law were
not threatening the institutional integrity of the judicial branch. 1
The judge further stated that the reporting requirements and
congressional review provided for in the PROTECT Act-which the
defendant claimed had an impermissibly intimidating effect on
judges-were in many ways not different in substance from the
effects of the original Sentencing Reform Act, which the Supreme
Court upheld against a separation of powers challenge in Mistretta
v. United States. 232 Moreover, he explained that any intimidation
that may exist would have little additional impact on the sentenc-
ing decisions ofjudges and the integrity of the judicial branch, given
that the information requested in the reporting requirements was
already available to the public and that the only direction Congress
229. United States v. VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1318,1324 (D. Utah 2003); see also Pamela
Manson, Judge Asserts His Right to Stray from Guidelines, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 28, 2003,
at Al (describing the VanLeer decision).
230. See United States v. Schnepper, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1170,1198-99 (D. Haw. 2004) (noting
that life tenure and undiminished compensation help to ensure that federal judges are not
intimidated); Vinegrad, supra note 98, at 4 (describing the comments of one Southern District
of New York district judge: "they can have their blacklist, but we have life tenure"); see also
Editorial, Monitoring Sentences Will Hardly Intimidate Judges, TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 19,2003,
at 10 (noting that federal judges, having life tenure, should not be intimidated by the mere
reporting of their sentences, and arguing that judges will still make what they believe to be
the appropriate sentencing decision).
231. Schnepper, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1194-99. But see United States v. Mendoza, No. 03-CR-
730-ALL, 2004 WL 1191118, *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12,2004) (holding that the requirement on
reporting individual judges' sentencing practices via the process implemented by the DOJ
in response to the PROTECT Act violates the separation of powers).
232. Schnepper, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1194-97. In Mistretta, the Supreme Court held that
nothing in the Sentencing Reform Act "creates any coercive power over members of the
Judicial Branch." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 406 n.28 (1989).
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could give in altering the guidelines system was through validly
enacted legislation.233 Finally, the judge noted that disagreements,
even public ones, between either the judicial branch and the
executive branch or the judicial branch and Congress, are common
and that judges are free to state their views and not to be swayed
improperly by the other branches because of the constitutionally
imposed safeguards of life tenure and undiminished compensa-
tion.234
The actions of federal judges, both over the history of our nation
and in response to the Feeney Amendment,235 demonstrate that, as
an open body, the federal judiciary is not shy about making the
choices it believes to be correct under the law, regardless of whether
their decisions are open to public scrutiny. It is hard to imagine
that sentencing decisions, even after the Feeney Amendment, will
be any exception to this general practice.
CONCLUSION
The passage of the Feeney Amendment, which restricts the
ability of federal judges to depart downward from the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, has been widely criticized on a variety of grounds.
Critiques of the Feeney Amendment as a policy matter may be
warranted. This Note has shown, however, that the overall theme
that critics of the amendment advance-that the amendment
violates the principle of judicial independence-is unsupported.
Judicial independence does not include policymaking discretion by
judges and the provisions of the amendment are consistent with the
constitutional power of Congress to set policy, including sentencing
policy. In addition, the perceived attacks on the independent
judiciary are not as severe as critics would make them seem. By
co-opting one of the key tenets underlying our constitutional system
of government to make a policy argument about the merits of
sentencing policy, many of the critics of the Feeney Amendment
233. Schnepper, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1196-97.
234. Id. at 1198-1200.
235. See supra Part I.C.3 for a discussion of the response of the judiciary to the Feeney
Amendment, both in their judicial acts and in public statements; see also supra note 204 and
accompanying text (discussing the willingness of the courts to hear constitutional challenges
to the Sentencing Guidelines and the Feeney Amendment).
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have expanded the concept of judicial independence beyond its
appropriate reach.
AUTHOR'S NOTE
In June 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Blakely v.Washington,23 6 a case that could have a major impact on the future
of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. This case and the aftermath it
has spawned in the federal courts do not implicate the issues of
judicial independence discussed in this Note. Yet this Section will
briefly outline the issues since they are relevant to the future of
the Sentencing Guidelines system as a whole. In Blakely, the 5-4
majority of the Court held that the sentence imposed on a defen-
dant under the Washington state sentencing system, although
within the statutory maximum punishment for his crime of
conviction under Washington law, violated the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a trial by jury. The Court applied the principle
it had announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey237 that "[olther than a
fact of prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crimebeyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."238
What was new about Blakely, however, was the refining of the
idea of what is a "statutory maximum." According to the majority,
it no longer means the overall upper limit of the statutory punish-
ment set by the legislature, but instead means the upper limit of
the presumptive guideline range that would apply in the determi-
nate sentencing guidelines system based on the facts reflected in
the jury's verdict or admitted by the defendant.2 39 The judge's
imposition, thus, was based on a judicial finding of "deliberate
cruelty," of an "exceptional sentence" of ninety months-less than
the statutory maximum but greater than the high end of the
presumptive guidelines range for the crime for which the jury
236. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
237. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
238. Id. at 490.
239. "M[The 'statutory maximum' forApprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant." Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
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convicted him-was deemed to violate the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights.24 °
The Supreme Court majority explicitly stated that "[t]he Federal
Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion on them."24'
Yet, that statement has not stopped the decision from greatly
impacting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines landscape. Justice
O'Connor, dissenting in Blakely, predicted that the decision would
affect many sentencing guideline systems, including the federal
system.242 She pointed out the similarities between the federal
and Washington state guidelines, and noted that the structural
differences between the two systems may be irrelevant in the
majority's constitutional analysis, and may in fact make the federal
guidelines more vulnerable to constitutional attack. 43 She predicted
that the Blakely ruling will have disastrous consequences for both
the federal guidelines and various state guidelines sentencing
schemes,2" stating that, "[olver 20 years of sentencing reform are
all but lost, and tens of thousands of criminal judgments are in
jeopardy,"24" and noting the difficult questions that will immedi-
ately face lower federal courts as a result of the Blakely ruling.246
There have in fact been serious reverberations from Blakely in
the federal courts and a great deal of confusion regarding its effect
on sentencing under the Sentencing Guidelines.247 Some federal
district and appeals courts have held that Blakely does apply to the
240. Id. at 2537-38.
241. Id. at 2538 n.9.
242. Justice O'Connor stated, "[ilf the Washington scheme does not comport with the
Constitution, it is hard to imagine a guidelines scheme that would." Id. at 2550 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). Justice Breyer, in his dissent, was also not optimistic about the future of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines---"[p]erhaps the Court will distinguish the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, but I am uncertain how." Id. at 2561 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 2549-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 2548-50.
245. Id. at 2550.
246. Id. at 2549.
247. For a more in-depth discussion of the effects of the Blakely decision on sentencing in
the federal courts, see generally Steven G. Kalar et al., A Blakely Primer: An End to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines?, CHAMPION, Aug. 28,2004, at 10; see also Amy Baron-Evans
& David Debold, Blakelyv. Washington: A Survival Guide for Practitioners, ANDREWS WHITE
COLLAR CRIME REP., Aug. 30, 2004, at 2; Stephanos Bibas, How Long?: A Close Supreme
Court Decision Trades Decades of Sentencing Reform for a Confusing Future, LEGAL TIMES,
July 5, 2004, at 52; Laurie P. Cohen & Gary Fields, Legal Quagmire: High Court Ruling
Unleashes Chaos Over Sentencing, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2004, at Al.
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Sentencing Guidelines and thus the Guidelines are unconstitutional
due to the various enhancements that may be added to a sentence
based on a judge's finding of facts not proven to a jury or admitted
by a defendant.2 48 Other courts of appeals have held that Blakely
does not affect the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,249 and at least
one court of appeals certified the question of Blakely applicability
to the Supreme Court.2 5 0 Additionally, the district courts have
applied a myriad of different sentencing approaches in the wake of
the Blakely decision.251 Due to this confusion, the Supreme Court
has agreed, at the urging of the DOJ, to hear two cases on this issue
on an expedited basis." 2 The cases, both of which are appeals from
lower court rulings that held the Guidelines unconstitutional in
light of Blakely, present two questions for decision by the Court.
First, whether Blakely applies to the Federal Guidelines such that
imposing an enhanced sentence based on judicial fact-finding
violates the Sixth Amendment.253 Second, if the answer to the first
question is "yes," are the Guidelines as a whole inapplicable in such
a case as a matter of severability analysis.254 Although how the
248. See United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Booker,
375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 2004 WL 1713654, 73 U.S.L.W. 3073 (U.S. Aug.
2, 2004) (No. 04-104); United States v. King, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2004); United
States v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D. Mass. June 18,2004); United States v. Marrero,
325 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d 757 (S.D.W.
Va. 2004); cf United States v. Green, No. CR.A. 02-10054-WGY, 2004 WL 1381101 (D. Mass.
2004) (pre-Blakely decision holding Guidelines unconstitutional on Sixth Amendment
grounds); United States v. Harris, 325 F. Supp. 2d 562 (W.D. Pa. 2004); United States v.
Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (D. Utah 2004).
249. See United States v. Hammoud, No. 03-4253, 2004 WL 2005622 (4th Cir. Sept. 8,
2004); United States v. Koch, No. 02-6278, 2004 WL 1899930 (6th Cir. Aug. 26,2004); United
States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2004).
250. See United States v. Penaranda, 375 F.3d 238 (2nd Cir. 2004).
251. See Baron-Evans & Debold, supra note 247, at 2 (describing the various sentencing
approaches taken by federal district courts since the Blakely decision).
252. See Shelly Murphy, Top Court to Weigh Sentencing Guide, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 3,
2004, at B2; see also United States v. Booker, No. 04-104, 2004 WL 1713654 (U.S. Aug. 2,
2004) (mem.) (writ of certiorari to the Seventh Circuit granted; case consolidated with United
States v. Fanfan; briefing schedule established; oral argument set for Oct. 4, 2004); United
States v. Fanfan, No. 04-104, 2004 WL 1713655 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2004) (mem.) (writ of certiorari
before judgment of the First Circuit granted; case consolidated with United States v. Booker;
briefing schedule established; oral argument set for Oct. 4, 2004).
253. Petition for Writ of Certiorari of the United States of America at I, United States v.
Booker, No. 04-104, 2004 WL 1713654 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2004) (mem.).
254. Id.
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Court will rule is uncertain,55 this issue will be resolved very soon,
as the cases are set to be argued in early October, 2004.256
David P. Mason*
255. See Baron-Evans & Debold, supra note 247, at 2 (speculating on various possibilities
of how the Supreme Court may rule). There is also the possibility that Congress may attempt
to solve the problem by legislating to alter the nature of the Guidelines, although both the
DOJ and the federal judiciary have urged Congress to defer a legislative solution until the
Supreme Court clarifies its stance on the application of Blakely to the Sentencing Guidelines.
See Cohen & Fields, supra note 247, at Al.
256. See Murphy, supra note 252, at B2.
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